Moscow's continuing success in monopolizing the the Caspian Sea region's vast oil and gas distribution networks. Russian-Azeri relations do not necessarily spell catastrophe for Armenia nor is it anything new. Russia already has very lucrative relations with Azerbaijan. As a matter of fact, despite Turkey's direct involvement in the Chechen insurgency, even Russian-Turkish bilateral trade have been very profitable for both nations. Economy is one thing, geopolitics is another. Moscow and Baku cooperate in the energy sector, politics, trade, etc. In reality, ever since the Alievs took power Baku has been very compliant to demands by Moscow. Therefore, if Russia was to abandon its strategic relations/alliance with the Armenian Republic it could/would have done so many-many years ago. However, what strategic value would that have had for Moscow? How would abandoning Armenia's alliance serve Russian interests? If Moscow today is getting what it wants from Baku, its only because Moscow holds the region's geopolitical/geoeconomic cards. It also holds the Nagorno Karabagh card. By contrast, Azerbaijan holds no real weight over Moscow. Azerbaijan is essentially a hostage to the Russian Federation. Baku knows that the Kremlin can essentially ruin Azerbaijan if it chose the path of belligerence. So, why would Moscow change what its been doing so successfully in the region? Why change the status quo? When the milk is free, why buy the cow?

Arevordi

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Russia: Courting Azerbaijan for Natural Gas

June, 2008

Summary

Russia’s Gazprom is in talks with Azerbaijan to purchase natural gas. Europe and Iran have also been courting Azerbaijan for its natural gas, but Gazprom has announced it is now willing to pay the same as, if not more than, the Europeans and Iranians are offering. If Azerbaijan reaches an agreement with Gazprom, it could cut off one of Europe’s options for diversifying its natural gas supplies away from Russia, while enabling Moscow to keep its natural gas exports flowing westward.

Analysis

Russian natural gas giant Gazprom is in talks with Azerbaijan to purchase natural gas. Russian Ambassador to the South Caucasus Vasily Istratov said June 4 that Gazprom CEO Alexei Miller met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev on June 2 in Baku. Gazprom is proposing to pay the same as — and possibly more than — Europe and Iran have offered for the natural gas. This marks one of the first times that Gazprom has actually said it will put up the cash to compete with other potential natural gas buyers. If Azerbaijan goes with the Russian suitor, it could cut off one of Europe’s options for further diversifying away from Russian energy supplies and could secure Moscow’s ability to continue its own westward exports.

Russia supplied Azerbaijan with natural gas until around 2006, when Azerbaijan’s own natural gas fields came online, eliminating the country’s dependence on Russian natural gas. But obviously the infrastructure is still in place, hooking Azerbaijan into Russia’s complex spider web of pipelines running from northern Russia and Central Asia to Europe, with spurs shooting down into the Caucasus. Each of the three lines running from Russia to Azerbaijan has an annual capacity of 10-13 billion cubic meters (bcm). One of those lines was turned into a line running through Georgia to Turkey, called the South Caucasus Pipeline, which takes natural gas from Azerbaijan’s Shah Deniz field to Europe.

Shah Deniz contains 1.2 trillion cubic meters of natural gas reserves and, in its first phase of production, pumps 8.6 bcm annually, which goes to Europe. The second phase of the field is expected to pump another 8.6 bcm annually starting in 2011. It is this second phase that is drawing bids not only from Europe, but also from Iran and now Russia. Russia differs from other bidders in that its structural links to Azerbaijan already exist; it would require a simple reversal of the natural gas flow through the Soviet-era pipelines to get Azerbaijani natural gas flowing to Russia and then Europe. If phase two is to produce natural gas for Europe, the Europeans will have to build a parallel line to the South Caucasus pipeline through Turkey, which is not really a difficult project financially for the Europeans.

The battle over Shah Deniz’s second phase thus comes down to who will put up the most cash for the natural gas supplies. Iran does not have the money to compete. In the past, the Europeans have always beaten Russia in bidding contests, because Moscow refuses to spend the money. But Gazprom has offered to pay $360 per thousand cubic meters, which is on the high end of what Europe is expected to pay for natural gas by 2011. Traditionally, Gazprom has bought cheap natural gas from former Soviet states; however, recently, countries such as Turkmenistan have hiked their prices, forcing Gazprom to adjust.

With the large amount of natural gas Russia sends to Europe — approximately a quarter of Europe’s consumption — Russia depends on supplies from Central Asia to help fill the orders. But Central Asian countries are looking eastward to China as a potential energy customer, making Moscow a little jittery about its ability to meet its export contracts in the long term. Azerbaijan could fill this void. If Russia can secure the second phase of Shah Deniz, it will mean that Europe failed to do so. Sure, Europe will end up with the natural gas supplies anyway, but it will still have to get it from Russia first — at whatever price Moscow demands.

Source: http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/rus...an_natural_gas

Gazprom blocks plans to pump Caspian gas to EU bypassing Russia

"Moves by the European Commission and the United States on the Caspian have forced Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom to act. Yesterday its CEO Alexei Miller proposed to Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev that Russia would buy gas from the republic at market prices under a long-term agreement. A source familiar with the proposal said purchases could start next year. Gazprom is ready to buy any amount offered by Azerbaijan at world prices, which may rise beyond $300. Previously, Azerbaijan imported Russian gas. In 2005, the monopoly sold t 4.5 billion cubic meters at $60 per 1,000 cubic meters, and in 2006, at $110. In 2007, gas supplies were cut by two thirds after prices rose to the average market figure of $230. Azerbaijan chose to increase its own production by exploiting the Shah Deniz gas field and agree a redistribution of gas quotas with Georgia and Turkey. Azerbaijan has 1.5 trillion cubic meters in known reserves, including 1.3 million in recoverable resources on the Shah Deniz field, located in the Azeri sector of the Caspian shelf. Azerbaijan consumes 11-14 billion cubic meters of gas per year. Despite this, the field's export potential, even in the first phase, is estimated at 12 billion cubic meters. During the second phase there are plans to increase exports by 5 to 7 billion cubic meters. In view of high transportation costs to Turkey and beyond through pipelines not yet built, whose estimated costs are rising all the time, Azerbaijan will find it difficult to compete with Gazprom. According to information available to Vremya Novostei, Aliyev said he would consider the proposal. After all, it opens a window of opportunity for further bargaining with gas buyers - Turkey, Greece, Italy and Austria. The fixed and moderately priced contracts have been concluded only with Turkey's Botas, and for 6.6 billion cubic meters. On the other hand, Baku is the main bastion of Western diplomacy in the Caspian region. Until now it was Azerbaijan that led the support for plans to create corridors for shipping energy resources to Europe bypassing Russia. There is a mix of interests here: first, transit (Azerbaijan and Turkey are linked by the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum gas pipeline, which are far from operating at full capacity), political relations (especially with Washington) and a sort of grievance against Gazprom. In addition, to agree to Russia's proposal would mean leaving its own pipeline to Turkey empty."

Source: http://en.rian.ru/analysis/20080603/109170654.html