From the moment Georgia launched a surprise attack on the tiny breakaway region of South Ossetia, prompting a fierce Russian counterattack, Israel has been trying to distance itself from the conflict. This is understandable: with Georgian forces on the retreat, large numbers of civilians killed and injured, and Russia’s fury unabated, Israel’s deep involvement is severely embarrassing. The collapse of the Georgian offensive represents not only a disaster for that country and its U.S.-backed leaders, but another blow to the myth of Israel’s military prestige and prowess. Worse, Israel fears that Russia could retaliate by stepping up its military assistance to Israel’s adversaries. “Israel is following with great concern the developments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and hopes the violence will end,” its foreign ministry said, adding with uncharacteristic dovishness, “Israel recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and calls for a peaceful solution.” Tbilisi’s top diplomat in Tel Aviv complained about the lackluster Israeli response to his country’s predicament and perhaps overestimating Israeli influence, called for Israeli “diplomatic pressure on Moscow.” Just like Israel, the diplomat said, Georgia is fighting a war on “terrorism.” Israeli officials politely told the Georgians that “the address for that type of pressure was Washington”.
While Israel was keen to downplay its role, Georgia perhaps hoped that flattery might draw Israel further in. Georgian minister Temur Yakobashvili -- whom the Israeli daily Haaretz stressed was xxxish -- told Israeli army radio that “Israel should be proud of its military which trained Georgian soldiers.” Yakobashvili claimed rather implausibly, according to Haaretz, that “a small group of Georgian soldiers were able to wipe out an entire Russian military division, thanks to the Israeli training” Since 2000, Israel has sold hundreds of millions of dollars in arms and combat training to Georgia. Weapons included guns, ammunition, shells, tactical missile systems, antiaircraft systems, automatic turrets for armored vehicles, electronic equipment and remotely piloted aircraft. These sales were authorized by the Israeli defense ministry. The Israeli connection,” Ynet, 10 August 2008). Training also involved officers from Israel’s Shin Bet secret service -- which has for decades carried out extrajudicial executions and torture of Palestinians in the occupied territories -- the Israeli police, and the country’s major arms companies Elbit and Rafael.
The Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis appears to have been cemented at the highest levels, and according to YNet, “The fact that Georgia’s defense minister, Davit Kezerashvili, is a former Israeli who is fluent in Hebrew contributed to this cooperation.” Others involved in the brisk arms trade included former Israeli minister and Tel Aviv mayor Roni Milo as well as several senior Israeli military officers. The key liaison was Reserve Brigadier General Gal Hirsch who commanded Israeli forces on the border with Lebanon during the July 2006 Second Lebanon War. (Yossi Melman, “Georgia Violence -- A frozen alliance,” Haaretz, 10 August 2008). He resigned from the army after the Winograd commission severely criticized Israel’s conduct of its war against Lebanon and an internal Israeli army investigation blamed Hirsch for the seizure of two soldiers by Hezbollah. According to one of the Israeli combat trainers, an officer in an “elite” Israel army unit, Hirsch and colleagues would sometimes personally supervise the training of Georgian forces which included “house-to-house fighting.” The training was carried out through several “private” companies with close links to the Israeli military.
As the violence raged in Georgia, the trainer was desperately trying to contact his former Georgian students on the battlefront via mobile phone: the Israelis wanted to know whether the Georgians had “internalized Israeli military technique and if the special reconnaissance forces have chalked up any successes” (Jonathan Lis and Moti Katz, “IDF vets who trained Georgia troops say war with Russia is no surprise,” Haaretz, 11 August 2008). Yet on the ground, the Israeli-trained Georgian forces, perhaps unsurprisingly overwhelmed by the Russians, have done little to redeem the image of Israel’s military following its defeat by Hezbollah in July-August 2006. The question remains as to why Israel was involved in the first place. There are several reasons. The first is simply economic opportunism: for years, especially since the 11 September 2001 attacks, arms exports and “security expertise” have been one of Israel’s growth industries. But the close Israeli involvement in a region Russia considers to be of vital interest suggests that Israel might have been acting as part of the broader U.S. scheme to encircle Russia and contain its reemerging power.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been steadily encroaching on Russia’s borders and expanding NATO in a manner the Kremlin considers highly provocative. Shortly after coming into office, the Bush Administration tore up the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and, like the Clinton administration, adopted former Soviet satellite states as its own, using them to base an anti-missile system Russia views as a threat. In addition to their “global war on terror,” hawks in Washington have recently been talking up a new Cold War with Russia. Georgia was an eager volunteer in this effort and has learned quickly the correct rhetoric: one Georgian minister claimed that “every bomb that falls on our heads is an attack on democracy, on the European Union and on America.” Georgia has been trying to join NATO, and sent 2,000 soldiers to help the U.S. occupy Iraq. It may have hoped that once war started this loyalty would be rewarded with the kind of round-the-clock airlift of weapons that Israel receives from the U.S. during its wars. Instead so far the U.S. only helped airlift the Georgian troops from Iraq back to the beleaguered home front.
By helping Georgia, Israel may have been doing its part to duplicate its own experience in assisting the eastward expansion of the “Euro-Atlantic” empire. While supporting Georgia was certainly risky for Israel, given the possible Russian reaction, it has a compelling reason to intervene in a region that is heavily contested by global powers. Israel must constantly reinvent itself as an “asset” to American power if it is to maintain the U.S. support that ensures its survival as a settler-colonial enclave in the Middle East. It is a familiar role; in the 1970s and 1980s, at the behest of Washington, Israel helped South Africa’s apartheid regime fight Soviet-supported insurgencies in South African-occupied Namibia and Angola, and it trained right-wing U.S.-allied death squads fighting left-wing governments and movements in Central America. After 2001, Israel marketed itself as an expert on combating so-called ”Islamic terrorism”.
Georgia’s government, to the detriment of its people, may have tried to play the role of a loyal servant of U.S. ambitions in that region -- and lost the gamble. Playing with empires is dangerous for a small country. As for Israel itself, with the Bush Doctrine having failed to give birth to the “new Middle East” that the U.S. needs to maintain its power in the region against growing resistance, an ever more desperate and rogue Israel must look for opportunities to prove its worth elsewhere. That is a dangerous and scary thing.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said on Wednesday he would use this week's visit to Russia to expand military ties with Moscow whose arms sales to the Middle Eastern state have angered the West. Israel and the United States have long urged Russia not to sell weapons to Syria -- a key Moscow ally during the Cold War now at the centre of Kremlin ambitions of reviving Russia's Soviet-era role in the Middle East. Assad told Kommersant newspaper that Russia's conflict with Georgia, in which Moscow says Georgia used Israeli-supplied equipment, underlined the need for Russia and Syria to tighten their defence cooperation. "Of course military and technical cooperation is the main issue. Weapons purchases are very important," he said. "I think we should speed it up. Moreover, the West and Israel continue to put pressure on Russia." Assad is expected to met Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday.
A diplomatic source in Moscow told Interfax news agency that Russia and Syria were preparing a number of deals involving anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems. "Damascus is Moscow's long-standing partner in military cooperation and we are expecting to reach an agreement in principle on new weapons deals," said the source. Syria is also interested in Russia's Pantsyr-S1 Air Defence Missile systems, BUK-M1 surface-to-air medium-range missile system, military aircraft and other hardware, the source said. Russia's military said this week Israel supplied military vehicles and explosives to Georgia and helped train its army. Israel says it does not supply arms to other countries as a government but private firms conduct equipment sales and training with the defence ministry's approval. Assad, whose army is largely equipped with Russian-designed military hardware, said Israel's role would only encourage countries like Syria -- a U.S. foe and ally of Iran -- to step up cooperation with Russia. "I think that in Russia and in the world everyone is now aware of Israel's role and its military consultants in the Georgian crisis," Assad told Kommersant. "And if before in Russia there were people who thought these forces can be friendly then now I think no one thinks that way." The West and NATO have sharply criticised Russia over its military action in Georgia this month.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Russia was turning into an outlaw in the conflict and accused Moscow of targeting civilians in Georgia. The conflict between Georgia and Russia erupted when Georgia tried to reimpose control over the breakaway, pro-Russian South Ossetia region earlier this month. Russia responded with a counter-attack that overwhelmed Georgian forces. Russia then moved troops beyond South Ossetia and a second separatist region, Abkhazia, and deep into Georgian territory.
The Russian aircraft carrier “Admiral Kuznetsov” is ready to head from Murmansk towards the Mediterranean and the Syrian port of Tartus. The mission comes after Syrian President Bashar Assad opens up for a Russian base in the area. The “Admiral Kuznetsov”, part of the Northern Fleet and Russia’s only aircraft carrier, will head a Navy mission to the area. The mission will also include the missile cruiser “Moskva” and several submarines, Newsru.com reports. President Assad in meetings in Moscow this week expressed support to Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia and Georgia. He also expressed interest in the establishment of Russian missile air defence facilities on his land. The “Admiral Kuznetsov” also last year headed a navy mission to the Mediterranean. Then, on the way from the Kola Peninsula and south, it stopped in the North Sea where it conducted a navy training exercise in the immediate vicinity of Norwegian offshore installations.
General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of staff of the Russian  Military revealed Tuesday the extent of the military assistance Moscow  claimed Jerusalem had given Georgia. "Israel armed the Georgian army,"  he told reported at a press conference held in the Russian capital.  According to Nogovitsyn, Israel provided Georgia with "eight types of  military vehicles, explosives, landmines and special explosives for the  clearing minefields." Since 2007, he continued, Israeli experts have  been training Georgian commando troops; and Israel had planned to supply  Georgia with heavy firearms, electronic weapons and tanks, but that  plan was eventually scrapped. Nogovitsyn stressed that despite reports  to the contrary, Russia began pulling its troops form Georgia on Monday,  claiming further that the withdrawal will be accelerated on Wednesday.  Georgia, he added, was in breach of the ceasefire agreement, since is  had not pulled its troops to the positions they held prior to the  conflict.
Russia Shows its Canines
The
 Russians did not only fight in Georgia but they drew a sharp red line 
for their national security. Simply they said that violation of the 
vital space of Russia means war. The United States understood the 
massage from the moment Russia started its military operations there and
 the Pentagon spokesperson declared that the American military personnel
 in Georgia have nothing to do with this war. However, this was not the 
only message Russia has sent. The more important message was that the 
presence of American military personnel in a country does not mean that 
this country would be immune if threatened Russian interests. At first, 
Bush asked the Russians to pull their troops while the Georgian army was
 advancing in South Ossetia. Then he called for a ceasefire after the 
Russian army engaged in a battle that its results could be predicted. 
The Russians gave him a deaf ear and they entered Tskhinvali by force 
and air-raided a military base near Tibilisi. At last, the Americans 
said that Georgia was partly responsible about the crisis.
The
 pro-Western Georgian government and President Mikheil Saakashvili took 
the uncalculated decision to attack the pro-Russia South Ossetia and the
 Russian peacekeeping force there. The Russians proclaimed that 
Washington instigated him to do. Then they accused Ukraine of doing 
that. If it was, Washington then the Americans sacrificed Georgia to 
test the Russian seriousness about defending its interests before 
deploying the anti-missile missiles in Czech and Poland and before 
giving the green line for Ukraine and Georgia to apply for NATO 
membership. If it was Ukraine then it wanted to revenge for its 
disturbed relationship with Russia about gas supply, application to 
NATO, navy bases on the Black Sea and the Russian support for the big 
opposition that lost the last election with slight marginal results. 
Anyhow, it seems that uncalculated decisions are not exclusive to the 
Middle East.
Now
 the Americans and the Ukrainians know. The consequences were clear. 
Poland asked the European Council to hold an emergency meeting. In other
 words, Poland asks its partner a serious question, what if Russia 
decided to return to East Europe. Putin announced that it would be 
difficult for Georgia to keep sovereignty over South Ossetia. Bush 
called for the integrity of Georgia. The Naval siege of Georgian coast 
means a lot. If Russia will stay in Abkhazia or if it will occupy the 
Georgian coast, it will not need the Ukrainian ports anymore. The 
pro-Russia Abkhazia started military operations against Georgia. It was 
clear that Russia well armed the two enclaves, Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. When Georgia accused Russia of using the air force against its 
bases, the Abkhazian separatists declared that their planes did that. To
 my knowledge, this is the first time a separatist group could have an 
air force.
Azerbaijan
 announced that it would stop its oil export through the Georgian port. 
Then the central Asian oil will be threatened if not controlled by 
Russians. Referring to the Iranian continuous threats that it would 
close the Gulf, and then the energy supply to Europe will be threatened.
 This means that the American fought seven years for nothing. From here a
 third world war would start if the US and Russia did not agree about 
the rules of the new game in central Asia quickly. When Kosovo declared 
independence, Russia threatened the West that it would announce Abkhazia
 and South Ossetia two independent states. President Saakashvili should 
not have given the Russian this opportunity. The rule is that small 
countries should not threat the interests of superpowers. If he tried to
 find common interests with Russia and postponed NATO application until 
the US and Russia strike their global deal which is a must 
geopolitically if they were to confront China, he would have saved his 
country much trouble and even he might have find ways to negotiate with 
separatists. He made himself a card in the American hands before the 
deal and Russia responded by making his country a card in its hands.
The
 American wanted also to test president Medevedv. It is clear that his 
policy is much the same like his Godfather Putin. Some observers say 
that Putin is still the de facto leader of the country. This means that 
the Americans have to live with Putin´s policy for a long time to come. 
After the eight years of Medevedv´s presidency, he and his Godfather may
 simply exchange posts again. The Russians learnt much from their lesson
 in Afghanistan and most probably, they will not repeat the mistake and 
go into a long war. They will arm the separatists and the Georgian peace
 would be a history if Tibilisi insisted on fighting. Another thing 
Putin declared that most of the two thousands citizens that were killed 
were Russians. He said frankly that this cleansing crime would not go 
without punishment. He simply says to the West as you tried our Serbian 
allies I will do the same to your Georgian allies. The Georgians accuse 
Russians of doing that and they said that the victims were Georgians. Of
 course, the American could not comment about cleansing war in Georgia. 
They cannot ask the international criminal court to do anything because 
Putin and Medevedv are not Bashir if they chose to believe the Georgian.
 However if they stroke a deal with Russia, they will give their back to
 the Georgian president and he would become a war criminal.
The
 Russian-Georgian war may be the most serious war in the Pax-Americana 
future. It may mark the return of Russia as a global force. It will draw
 another red line for the US. Now the world has two powers if not three 
with China who could start a war without previous coordination with 
regional or international powers. This reduces the American influence in
 some regions. The West depends upon Afghan´s neighboring countries, 
Russia one of them, in the logistics in its war there. Most of these 
countries are in the Russian vital space. Most probably, the West will 
give Georgia the lip service and leaves it for Russia to decide its 
future to ensure the safety of its operations.
One
 last thing a Russian top official said that Israelis trained the 
Georgian army. The Israeli Foreign Ministry asked the Military 
Institutions to stop arms sales to Georgia after few hours. Previously 
Israel did not care about any country but the US. Does Tzipi Levini feel
 the change? Both US and Russia have changed during Bush and Putin era. 
What is happening in Georgia is a hot chapter of their dialogue about 
their future alliance. The exchange of words between the American and 
Russian presidents did not reflect their real position on the ground. 
President Bush said that he stood for Georgia´s integrity, but his 
Foreign Secretary Rice met with Georgian President Saakashvili to force 
him to sign a ceasefire that its fifth article stated the independence 
and sovereignty but not integrity of his country. The Washington Post 
said frankly that Russia is more important for the US than Georgia is. 
To assess gains and losses of the different parts of the crisis, one 
should not compare Russia to Georgia. Comparing Georgia to South Ossetia
 and Abkhazia regionally and comparing Russia to the US globally gives a
 better in depth analysis.
On
 the regional level, Georgia was the first loser. It started a war to 
control its breakaway South Ossetia that ended with risking losing both 
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and parts of its territories became under 
Russian occupation. Some Georgian cities have been destroyed. It is 
difficult for investors to risk putting their money in Georgian projects
 again. The Georgian army was easily defeated and the road to Tibilisi 
was open for the Russian army. It became very doubtful that Georgia 
membership in NATO or EU might be achieved any time soon or even after 
many years. Most probably, the temporary ceasefire accord will be 
replaced by a second one after long negotiations that will put Georgia 
in the Russian influence sphere and will restrict armament of the 
Georgian army. Whether a temporary second cold war became the world 
order or US-EU-Russia partnership could be reached, Georgia will not 
have any role except for its port Porti on the Black Sea that might by 
used by the alliances. Saakashvili is the biggest loser and his 
political future is in its last days or months. If he is lucky, he will 
escape serving long terms in Russian prisons. The US did not give its 
ally except one million dollars worth of humanitarian aid beside words 
of support.
On 
the global level, Russia achieved some of its targets. It put an end for
 the American humiliation that has been continuous since 1989. It proved
 itself as a guarantor of the Caucasus as Medevedv said. It showed the 
American its military might and the will to use this might in a limited 
low cost military operation. It put a red line for NATO not to further 
approach Russia. If Abkhazia got its independence or became a Russian 
Republic then Russia will secure its navy accessibility to the Black Sea
 and the Mediterranean. The ex-Soviet Union Asian independent states 
will think twice before signing any military or security accord with the
 US and the West and most probably, Russia will be the third party in 
these partnerships. Russia became the controller of European energy 
supply after it achieved control or threat of oil and gas pipelines from
 Central Asia ensuring a rift between the US and Europe in their Russian
 policies. It told the world, that it did not fear another Cold War. Its
 Foreign Minister said bluntly to the Americans that the US has to 
choose between partnership with Russia or its support for Georgia. 
Shortly after Rice and Saakashvili press conference, the BBC asked an 
American political science professor to comment. He said that the US 
needs Russia more than Russia needs the US. The American Defence 
Minister Gates attacked Russia verbally but when he was asked about 
trust between Bush and Putin, he said that national security is built on
 risks and interests not on trust. Bush visited the CIA headquarters to 
brief him about the situation and he was told that the American policy 
about Russia is being revised.
Why
 does the US revise its Russian policy? Regardless of the US-Poland 
preliminary accord of the antimissile shield that provoked the Russian 
Deputy of Chief to announce that Poland will be a target for Russian 
missiles, the Americans discovered that their policy of humiliating 
Russia went so far that they have lost a dear. Medevedv said more 
bluntly that Georgia or any state harms Russians the military operations
 will be repeated. The crisis exposed the Western alliance that there 
are rifts in the national security views. While Bush was talking about 
isolating Russia, the German Defence Minister stressed on having open 
channels with Russia. Few days ago, Sarkozy admitted that Russia has the
 right to protect Russian speaking communities while he was in Moscow. 
The German Chancellor Merkel said that Russia slightly overreacted in 
the press conference while she was in Moscow. It is noticeable that if 
one has not heard the event he would have find that some Western Media 
just omit few adjectives and adverbs that mean a lot. The Western Media 
omitted the word slightly when it commented about Merkel´s statement. 
When Bush warned Russia that now is not 1968 when the ex-Soviet Union 
conquered Czechoslovakia, he had to remember that now is not 1945, when 
Europe needed Marshal project. It is not only the energy that may 
dictate European independent policies about Russia but also security. 
The KJB servicemen are now serving in the Russian intelligence. They 
have contacts with communist terrorist groups as Badermienhoff in 
Germany, Bask Revolutionists in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the 
Republican Army in Ireland, the Communists in Greece, the Kurds in 
Turkey, the Red Army in Japan and many others. With the Euro equals one 
and half dollar Europe does not want to risk its energy supply, economy,
 and its security.
Will
 be there another Cold War? Geopolitically, the American strategists 
will discover that they need Russia and the American media analysis told
 that. If there will be another Cold War it will be temporary and most 
probably the next American Administration will have another pack of 
policies. The US cannot risk Russia siding with China. This scenario 
means the end of Pax-Americana for good. The Neo-Cons´ militarization of
 foreign policy proved to be harmful. If the US and Russia did not agree
 soon, there might be a high level of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
During the crisis, the US called for China to cooperate in Darfur. This 
means that the idea of giving a space for other superpowers is present 
in the strategic thinking in Washington. As both Russia and Georgia 
accuse each other of ethnic cleansing but the US chose to believe 
Georgia, the international court prosecutor Okambo, cannot issue an 
arrest warranty against Medevedv and Putin. He declared a very strange 
statement that he accused Bashir as a person not as a president. If 
Okambo was serious, then Bashir took his decisions about Darfur in the 
scope of being a president. Anyhow double standard policies was one of 
the causes that made Russia act as tit for tat, Kosovo for Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia and Saakashvili for its Serbian war criminals. Regardless 
of who committed crimes, the Russians tell the Americans that you 
established a rule stating that victorious dictates laws and now the 
Russian Bear is the victorious over an army that its weapons are 
American and its officers are trained by American and Israeli trainers.
Will
 the Caucasus war have reflections and implications on the Middle East? 
Iran may have a larger space for its nuclear file and Syria may show 
some strength in its negotiations with Israel. Yet, one should know that
 both the US and Russia will look after their interests. They both have 
the ability and the will to use force but not against each other. 
Interests dictate national security policies and dictate alliances with 
superpowers. As Europe guards its steps between the US and Russia, the 
Arabs should do the same. The US may accelerate the Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations and may change its policies about Iran to destroy its 
nuclear facilities to deprive Russia from having an ally who is already 
hostile to the West and the US in particular. One last word until Russia
 responds to the US in Latin America and in the Middle East there is no 
Cold War. The most important is the fact that making a country a card 
encourages others to play games for their interests. This is the story 
of the man who put his hand in the Bear´s mouth to satisfy others who 
used him as a Guinea Pig in the political laboratory.
Source: 
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles
The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
The
 Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in 
Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already 
shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing
 situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and
 is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we 
have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to 
reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not 
have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States 
or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The 
balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when
 to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.
Let’s
 begin simply by reviewing the last few days. On the night of Thursday, 
Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of 
South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as 
an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces 
drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border. 
Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite 
of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of 
South Ossetia. On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South 
Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air 
power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia 
acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed 
with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack —
 the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at 
their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and 
competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded
 in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday, 
Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.
On
 Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper, 
attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian 
city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist 
region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to 
cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By 
this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli 
and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international 
airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40 
miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and 
resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to 
undertake it.
The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
In
 this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the
 Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had 
been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian 
villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense 
than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not 
have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must
 have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply. 
Georgia’s move was deliberate. The United States is Georgia’s closest 
ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with 
civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian 
government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable 
that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and 
intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware 
that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian 
frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and 
signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the 
fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions. 
The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could 
the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the 
posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed 
the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian
 invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It
 is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack 
against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they 
were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first
 is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States 
either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the 
Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s 
intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other 
countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the 
Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was 
paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive 
military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the 
1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for 
years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk 
the consequences of an invasion.
If
 this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this 
situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance
 of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the
 new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United 
States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the 
invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically, 
Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans 
need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them.
 Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more 
than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this 
was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for 
months, as we have discussed, and they struck.
The Western Encirclement of Russia
To
 understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first 
is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of
 view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and 
Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear,
 the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal 
affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the 
encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill 
Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the 
former Soviet Union empire. That promise had already been broken in 1998
 by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and 
again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the 
former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the 
three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
The
 Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including 
Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national 
security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to 
destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went 
so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO 
deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was
 that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break 
Russia. The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the 
United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were
 friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The 
principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict, 
national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated 
in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions 
for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and 
privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but 
instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in 
practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.
From
 the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United
 States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and 
strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that
 the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian 
wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If 
Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like 
this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the 
Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined 
to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all
 the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of 
which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared 
independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia, 
the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent 
under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and 
Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for 
internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more 
important.
Russian
 Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet 
Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to 
retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the
 Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security
 was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that 
during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a 
NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO 
member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia 
surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in 
various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and,
 in some cases, China.
Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
Putin
 did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to 
re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union 
region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to 
re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at
 least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that 
Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face
 of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did
 want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the 
United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as
 being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. By 
invading Georgia as Russia did, Putin re-established the credibility of 
the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed
 an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle 
East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American
 consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the 
Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it 
is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as 
well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense 
installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to 
understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their 
security.
The 
Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This 
actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are, 
the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to
 drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk. The 
Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the 
United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus, 
and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians
 to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they 
do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the 
highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue 
to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a 
position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in 
Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria. 
Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its
 strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has 
to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in
 Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in 
Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in
 Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan.
In
 other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The 
Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are 
dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If 
nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have
 resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by
 any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear 
weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has 
also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its 
position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready 
to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily, 
that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they 
have demonstrated it. The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public 
return to great power status. This is not something that just happened —
 it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing 
intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase
 of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that 
the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and 
short on resources. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a 
new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down 
elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a 
surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical 
foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an
 empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality,
 but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being 
rectified.
Source: 
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo..._balance_power    
Tbilisi Admits Misjudging Russia 
Georgia
 did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia 
and was completely unprepared for the counter-attack, the deputy defence
 minister has admitted. Batu Kutelia told the Financial Times that 
Georgia had made the decision to seize the South Ossetian capital of 
Tskhinvali despite the fact that its forces did not have enough 
anti-tank and air defences to protect themselves against the possibility
 of serious resistance. “Unfortunately, we attached a low priority to 
this,” he said, sitting at a desk with the flags of Georgia and Nato (to
 which Georgia does not belong) crossed behind him. “We did not prepare 
for this kind of eventuality.” The Georgian military felt there was only
 a low probability of a massive Russian counter-attack, despite the 
bloody way in which Russia destroyed Chechnya, on the other side of the 
Caucasus mountains, in two wars during the 1990s and the fact that 
separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had Russian backing. Georgian 
forces were unprepared when the Russian counter-strike came, Mr Kutelia 
said. “I didn’t think it likely that a member of the UN Security Council
 and the OSCE would react like this,” Mr Kutelia said. His amazement 
that Russia would use force against a smaller neighbour was echoed by 
David Darchiashvili, head of the parliamentary European integration 
committee. “No one expected Russia would mobilise and invade,” he said. 
Georgia’s 20,000-man army, built up at a cost of $2bn with the help of 
US trainers and cast-off Warsaw Pact equipment, was organised to deal 
with “brushfire” wars with separatist enclaves on its borders and to 
contribute to missions such as Iraq as a way of shoring up Georgia’s 
ties with the west, not to do battle with Russia. Mr Kutelia still puts 
blame for the war squarely on the Russians and their South Ossetian 
allies, saying that in early August Ossetian fighters began to shell 
Georgian positions and villages.
He
 said Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel from
 North Ossetia before President Mikheil Saakashvili unleashed his 
military against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7, 
but offered no evidence to back this up. Mr Kutelia said that the 
Georgians moved despite not having enough anti-tank and air defences, 
not expecting the Russians to react with overwhelming force.“At some 
point there was no choice,” he said. Mr Kutelia said damage to Georgia’s
 military infrastructure was “significant”, and it would take an 
enormous amount of foreign help to rebuild Georgia’s defensive 
capabilities, something the Russians have promised to flatten again if 
they feel it poses a threat. Russian troops have entered many of 
Georgia’s military bases, often under the eyes of a cowed Georgian army.
 They have confiscated US Humvee vehicles, blown up coastguard vessels 
and ransacked some of Georgia’s most modern military bases, destroying 
radar and other air defences, as well as reportedly capturing Georgian 
tanks, small arms and ammunition. So far Russia has made no move to 
return its booty. The cost of Georgia’s lack of preparation could be 
seen earlier this week, when seven soldiers killed in earlier fighting 
were buried in a cemetery on a dusty hillside outside the capital. About
 20 troops in fatigues, and one in black track pants, watched from the 
shade of a pine tree as a bulldozer pushed sandy soil into the long 
trench holding the bodies.
Source: 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d8beefe-6...0779fd18c.html
Georgia Facing Reality of Defeat
When
 Russian troops eventually pull out of Georgian towns such as Gori and 
Zugdidi, ordinary Georgians will heave a sigh of relief. But that will 
also be the moment that they take on board the fact that the two 
territories at the heart of the conflict with Moscow, South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia, although formally still regarded internationally as Georgian 
territory, are now essentially lost to them. The people who will suffer 
most in the long term from this conflict are more than 20,000 ethnic 
Georgians from a mosaic of villages in South Ossetia who have now mostly
 fled. Relatively few Georgians left during or after the small-scale 
1990-92 conflict over South Ossetia and despite intermittent skirmishes 
and incidents, neighbourly contacts continued. Reporters who have passed
 through many of the villages in the last few days say they are now in 
ruins. The Russian authorities and their South Ossetian allies are now 
saying that they will not allow the Georgians back any time soon. A 
Russian foreign ministry statement on August 18 said, "It is clear that 
some time – and not a short period of time – must pass in order to heal 
the wounds and to restore confidence. Only after this, the conditions 
will be created for discussing practical aspects related to the problems
 of refugees." Hundreds of South Ossetians also lost their homes in the 
Georgian military assault of 7-8 August and, it appears, in the ensuing 
Russian counter-attack - but they have the small consolation of knowing 
they can start rebuilding them.
Russian leverage
The
 prospect is also now much bleaker for the 240,000 or so ethnic 
Georgians who were registered as displaced from the 1992-3 conflict in 
Abkhazia. Their hopes of return were predicated on a successful peace 
agreement which now looks more elusive than ever. Around 50,000 
Georgians live in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district under an Abkhaz 
administration. So far they have managed to stay in their homes, but 
their future is also more precarious. It is not just a matter of 
Georgian control. It will also be harder now to maintain an 
international presence in the two disputed regions. The final point in 
the six-point ceasefire plan reads: "Pending an international mechanism 
[in South Ossetia], Russian peacekeeping forces will implement 
additional security measures." That effectively puts an end to the 
former Joint Peacekeeping Forces, which had a Georgian contingent. It 
also gives Moscow even more leverage than before over the shape of any 
security arrangements for the region. Moscow is already insisting it can
 have the only real security presence there. "We are of course not 
against international peacekeepers... but the problem is that the Abkhaz
 and the Ossetians do not trust anyone except Russian peacekeepers," 
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told German chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unattainable dream
The
 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only 
international organization with a mandate in South Ossetia, wants to 
dispatch an additional 100 monitors to South Ossetia. But Russia has 
dragged its feet, saying it wanted to agree the terms of their 
deployment in more detail and the OSCE has so far agreed to send just 20
 more monitors. The OSCE had just nine military monitors on the ground 
in South Ossetia when fighting started there on 7-8 August. The European
 Union, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner taking the lead, 
also says it want to provide peacekeepers, but Mr Kouchner's Swedish 
counterpart, Carl Bildt, admitted this might not work. "There are no 
signs of the Russians letting in anyone else," he said. In Abkhazia, the
 United Nations has a small contingent of around 130 unarmed monitors, 
who were bystanders in the recent crisis. When the Abkhaz, with Russian 
support, wanted to capture the mountainous Upper Kodori Gorge district 
from the Georgians, they merely gave the UN monitors there a 24-hour 
warning to leave. The EU has approved small aid programmes for both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last few years, but they have looked 
relatively modest when compared to the vast amount of Russian money 
coming into both regions. Abkhazia is bigger and more diverse than South
 Ossetia with a lively media and many non-governmental organizations. 
Many Abkhaz intellectuals dreamed of having some kind of independence 
free of both Georgia and Russia and with links across the Black Sea to 
the EU but that now looks unattainable.
'Double standards'
Internationally
 mediated peace talks over both disputes had stalled and there is little
 chance of them resuming properly any time soon. Faced with a tightening
 Russian grip, Western leaders can only fall back on expressing support 
for Georgia's right to these territories. US President George W Bush 
made this commitment on 16 August, saying: "Georgia's borders should 
command the same respect as every other nation's. There's no room for 
debate on this matter." This becomes a moral argument, with the Russians
 answering that after supporting Kosovo's unilateral secession from 
Serbia, the West is guilty of "double standards" in the Caucasus. Caught
 in the middle of these international wrangles are the current and 
former populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Abkhaz, 
Ossetians and other nationalities such as Armenians on the one hand, and
 the displaced Georgians on the other. They often get along fine when 
they have a chance to engage in low-level meetings arranged by foreign 
organisations or across market stalls. Now, unfortunately, they are 
being wrenched apart further than ever by conflict.
Source: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7571002.stm    
 
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