How
the Russian-Georgian War Has Changed the World - Interview with Paul Goble
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On the second anniversary of the Russian-Georgian war Yulia Savchenko talked about the consequences of confrontation and conflict lessons with Paul Goble - political scientist, a former specialist on ethnic minorities the U.S. State Department, and now a researcher with the Diplomatic Academy of Azerbaijan.
Yulia Savchenko: This is the second anniversary of the Georgian-Russian conflict of 2008. Different people have taken different things from this conflict. What do you think Georgia has learned from the conflict?
Paul Goble: Different people in Georgia have learned different lessons. Many, except perhaps the president, understand why the conflict happened. On the eve of the fighting, he clearly showed that he had misinterpreted the rules of the game in the international arena as well as misinterpreted remarks of the US President and Secretary of State. He interpreted their statements that the US always supports its friends as meaning he could do whatever he pleased. Since that time, he has used the threatening posture of Russia to distract attention and silence his opponents. Whatever else, Georgia in the future needs to show more creativity in dealing with the new environment than it did earlier. Others have learned from the conflict. Russia’s neighbors now can see that Moscow is not constrained in showing who is the boss in the region even to the point of using force. No one thought that was the case, but now these countries have no guarantee that it won’thappen again. This has changed their perception of their own defensive needs and of Russia more generally. That is only one of the ways Russia suffered as a result of the war. While Vladimir Putin and his team have proclaimed their victory, many Russians recognize that his decision was ill-conceived as well The Russian army did not do well, with poorly trained soldiers shooting at each other. As a result, Russia does not look as strong as it did. Instead, it looks like a weak bully. That is a very dangerous situation for any country to be in.
JS: And what this conflict has taught the United States?
PG: The US certainly has learned a few things. Perhaps first of all, we have had the lesson driven home that when we deal with other countries, we must always be sure that our statements are not misinterpreted. Clearly Saakashvili heard things from Washington that Washington did not in the end intend. U.S. policymakers need to be clear about what the US will and won’t do, regardless of a desire to show oneself supportive and friendly. Another lesson I hope we have learned is that Moscow today is not prepared to live by the rules. To go forward, Russia will have to work hard to reassure the US and others that it will behave as countries are supposed to.
JS: Two years ago, after the clash between Russia and Georgia, you testified that you support the principle of national self-determination. Do you think the Obama administration will follow this advice, especially in the wake of the International Court’s decision on Kosovo?
PG: I believe in the right of nations to self-determination. I believe that Abkhazia has demonstrated its ability to translate this right into reality. The situation regarding South Ossetia is much more problematic both because of the existence of North Ossetia, its own relations with the Russian Federation, and its geographic position as a kind of dagger aimed at Tbilisi. In many respects, the step that would most disturb Moscow would be if the West and the US in particular were to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Imagine what it would mean if 27 NATO members had embassies in Sukhumi. That would open the question of the recognition of republics now north of the Russian Federation border. I do not exclude such a development. It would be more interesting if Georgia has recognized Abkhazia. Abkhazians, of course, would likely seek to find a way to prevent that if only because of the obvious undesirable consequences for Moscow. Consequently, it won’t happen soon. But if these states remain recognized only by a few states, this will be the beginning of an era in which there may be many partially recognized states. Thinking ahead to the tenth anniversary of the conflict, I hope that at that time we will be able to discuss this crisis more soberly with fewer comments about Russian aggression, more foreign embassies in Abkhazia. I don’t know whether an American one will be among them, but some kind of reconciliation of all parties is likely, if only because living in a world where all past crimes are constantly at the center of attention is so very difficult.
Source: VOA News (Russian)
The Georgia War and its consequences, by Alexander Rahr
Putin and Medvedev had just settled into their new political leadership roles. The whole world remained in expectation of a new impulse towards modernization in Russia by the liberal Medvedev. The West decided to postpone the plan of greater NATO expansion to the East, keeping Ukraine and Georgia on the waiting list. In Poland and the Czech Republic the opposition against the US missile defence system had increased. Washington and Moscow were not arguing about the Iranian Nuclear program any more. Medvedev promised Ukraine that mafia structures should be destroyed and that gas business should get more transparent. The US presidential campaign had begun and it seemed that Obama, the candidate of the Democratic Party, planned new peace initiatives towards Russia. Poland and Lithuania put a veto on negotiations, concerning a new partnership agreement between the EU and Russia. Analysts were speaking about a new era of thaw characterizing the relationship between Russia and the West.
But then everything occured very fast. Over the night of August 7th/8th
2008, during the opening of the Olympics Games in China, a new war in
the Caucasus started. The world was shocked. Instead of sporting
competitions, the main attention of all the news was devoted to rolling
tanks, to waves of refugees, and to bombed cities and the many dead.
Nobody could believe it: the small Georgian “David” provoked
(challenged) the Russian “Goliath”. Parallel to the war events, a
propaganda battle was sparked by all the sides to an extent never seen
before. At that point, it was not clear what exactly was happening on
the south side of the Caucasian mountains. The information was
confusing and contradictory. Who was the offender? Who was the victim?
Were there several truths?
The fact is that there had been a
running conflict on the border of the Georgian heartland and the
breakaway republic of South Ossetia for many years. Since the civil war
between Georgia and South Ossetia in 1991-2, there had been both
Russian and Georgian troops along the border. However, Russia was not
seen as playing the role of an honest mediator, adding fuel to the
conflict by issuing Russian passports to the inhabitants of the
breakaway republic. In addition, Russia was charged with letting the
Ossetians arm themselves to the teeth and shell Georgian peace-keeping
troops and neighbouring Georgian villages unhindered. The north of
South Ossetia is actually isolated from Russia by the Caucasian
Mountains. However, there exists the so-called Roki tunnel, which was
hewn out of the mountains about 50 years ago. The tunnel is the main
economic supply-route from Russia to the breakaway republic. Georgia
considers the self-proclaimed government of South Ossetia to be a
smuggler regime. On the horror night of August 7th-8th, the Roki tunnel played a decisive role for the outcome of the war.
On the pretext of protecting the
Georgian villages from shelling by South Ossetian guerrillas
(irregulars), on this night Saakashvili attacked South Ossetia. With
his blessing, 12,000 armed men, upgraded with western and Israeli
military equipment, were deployed into the breakaway republic. At 22:00
the ceasefire between the Georgian Blue Berets and the Ossetians was
broken. The line of the Russian peacekeepers was overrun, and many Blue
helmets were killed. The capital of South Ossetia, Tskhinvali, came
under fire. The plan of Saakashvili was to drive out the Ossetian
population via the Roki tunnel to North Ossetia, one of the Russian
republics in the North Caucasus. The Georgians were hoping that the
mass exodus of the refugees via the Roki tunnel would prevent the
Russian military advancing from the other side.
Georgia committed a mistake crucial for
the outcome of the war. Obviously, Saakashvili did not expect such a
quick reaction from Russia or resistance from the Ossetian partisans,
although he was probably informed via satellite about the Russian troop
movements in the north. But, at the same time, Putin was at the opening
of the Olympic Games in Beijing. Medvedev seemed not to have things
under control. Tbilisi believed it would be possible to set a quick
precedent in South Ossetia. But Russia has already evacuated several
hundred civilians via the Roki tunnel to North Ossetia one week before,
a fact of which Saakashvili could not have been aware.
The Kremlin found itself in a dilemma:
either give up South Ossetia and risk losing power status in the
region, or fend off the attack. Twelve hours after the Georgian attack,
Moscow sent tanks of the 58th army through the Roki tunnel
into Georgia. The main aim of this action was to support the South
Ossetian irregulars against the Georgian regular troops. Russia would
speak later of an attempted genocide against the Ossetian population.
Georgia would accuse Russia of provoking the war, shelling Georgian
villages from South Ossetia. Analysts disagreed as to whether
Saakashvili fell into a trap set by Moscow or if he decided in favour
of a blitzkrieg, expecting support form the West. Both sides had enough
reasons to escalate the conflict in such a manner in order to solve
their “strategic task” in the region.
Around midnight, Georgian troops
occupied Tskhinvali. Thousands of civilians fled via the Roki Tunnel
(in the opposite direction to the moving Russian tanks) into Russia.
According to Russian information sources, during that night almost 2000
civilians became victims of the Georgian aggression. Later, Western
sources will argue that the number of victims was far smaller. The
international human rights organization, Human Rights Watch, reported
that Georgian troops used cluster bombs against the civilian
population. The Georgian side asserted that Russian air raids had
destroyed Tskhinvali. In any case, the Georgian forces maintained their
defence line for some time. On August 9, Russia brought in its Air
Force. According to rumours, Putin threatened Saakashvili, in case of
continuing resistance, to bomb Tbilisi. The Russian Navy sailed from
Sevastopol in order to control the Abkhazian Coast. No further doubts
persisted. The world was witnessing a new war. After many hours of
fighting for Tskhinvali and heavy losses on the Georgian side (people
talked about 4,000 dead Georgian soldiers), Saakashvili announced the
retreat in the afternoon of August 8. His coup had failed. His
well-trained and equipped army had underestimated the reaction of the
Russians. The biggest part of the Georgian military equipment was
destroyed.
In a mad rush, Georgia pulled her army
back. As a consequence, the Russian troops pushed forward, a step that
would be later criticized by western media as disproportionate. The
Russian Air Force destroyed within a few hours the major part of the
Georgian military infrastructure. The radar tower in Tbilisi, the oil
terminal in the port of Poti as well as the military garrison in Gori
were bombed. Television pictures of Saakashvili lying on the ground,
escaping an imaginary Russian air strike, flashed around the world. In
spite of the fact that Georgian air defences were able to shoot down
two Russian fighter-bombers, the Russian army already controlled the
whole northern part of Georgia by the end of August 10. The vanguard of
the Russian offensive was formed from special units of former Chechen
guerrillas, who had been considered by Moscow only a few years before
as terrorists. They seized the Georgian city of Gori under the battle
cry “Allah is great”. The Georgian population escaped to the southern
parts of Tbilisi. Georgia and Russia accused each other of conducting
ethnic cleansing. In the part occupied by Russia, there took place
looting by the Ossetian guerrillas, and revenge on the Georgian
civilian population.
Russia continued to destroy Georgian
military installations, justifying it as revenge for the death of the
Russian Blue helmets and Russian citizens in the South Ossetia. In
reality, Georgia was to be rendered incapable of conducting future
attacks against South Ossetia. In addition, Russia wanted to prevent
Georgia from becoming a front-line NATO state on its southern doorstep.
Suddenly, a second front was opened. The other breakaway republic,
Abkhazia, seized the historical opportunity finally to separate from
the Georgian heartland. As in South Ossetia, there had been previous
skirmishes between Abkhazians and the Georgian military. The Abkhazian
separatists kicked the Georgian army units out of their strategic
positions in the mountains around Abkhazia. The Russian Black Sea Fleet
provided essential protection from naval attacks.
The new Caucasian war ended after only
three days. But the real battle in the international media and
diplomatic arena was only just beginning. And in this battle Russia
seemed to be losing, experiencing difficulties explaining her position
and her “truth” concerning the reasons and the course of the war to an
angry western public. In the eyes of most Westerners, Georgia was a
small choir-boy and Russia the aggressor. The Western media almost
exclusively reported on Georgian civilian casualties and damage; only
rarely did the fate of the Ossetians get a hearing.
On the other hand, people in the west,
particularly from former Warsaw Pact countries were reminded of the
events of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 and
Afghanistan in 1979. Suddenly, fear spread of a Russian attack on the
former Soviet republics. Some Western media stoked the fear by talking
about a neo-imperialist Russia. The presidents of Poland, Ukraine and
of three Baltic states gathered for a solidarity demonstration for
Saakashvili in Tbilisi. They wanted to help their ally to rewrite
history and to present Russia as the single aggressor in this conflict.
The United States supported this anti-Russian rhetoric and castigated
the “imperialist war against Georgia” by Moscow. Between the U.S. and
Poland the long-pending agreement on the stationing of a missile
defence systems was signed. At the signing ceremony, it was made clear
that this defence system was not only pointed against states like Iran.
Moscow was expected to understand the message. Due to American
pressure, the NATO-Russia Council was put on ice.
Meanwhile, the EU Council and the
French president, Nicolas Sarkozy, hurried to Moscow to prepare a
ceasefire and a peace agreement. But just before Sarkozy arrived in
Moscow, president Medvedev declared an end to the military operation
against Georgia. The course of the negotiations between the EU and
Russia was extremely complicated. Russia refused to recognize in the
Peace Treaty the sovereignty of the Georgian state, including two
breakaway republics. Medvedev also demanded the recognition of a
“protected zone” for the Russian Peace troops along the border between
Abkhazia/South Ossetia and the Georgian heartland. Sarkozy, who wanted
to stop the war as soon as possible, gave his approval. How wide this
buffer zone within Georgian heartland should be was not a subject of
the negotiations. The French spoke later about “a few kilometres”,
where the Russian Blue helmets are allowed. Russia expanded this zone
unabashedly almost upto the Black Sea coast.
After the war, it became impossible to
force the Abkhazians and the Ossetians to rejoin Georgia, either in the
short or medium term. However, for the West the recognition of the
state sovereignty of the breakaway republics was out of question,
especially, after such blatant International Law violations by Moscow.
The French foreign minister referred to the war as a return to the
middle Ages. The astonishment of the international community was,
however, incomprehensible. The conflict had been there for all to see.
But the EU seemed to be always taken by surprise by events in Eastern
Europe. The attention of the EU was only fixed on the colour
revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, on the gas dispute between Ukraine
and Russia, as well as on Russia resuming a position of power.
Obviously, the Western community had
prematurely put the disintegration of the Soviet Union on the shelf.
The post-Soviet states and regimes often evolved (with western
participation) into fragile states. Numerous territorial and ethnic
conflicts still persisted in a frozen state. In the Caucasus alone many
of these potential conflicts came to the fore. Some reasons for these
latent conflicts across the post-Soviet space were caused by the
transitional process of the 90s as well as by external geopolitical
factors. One of the conflict issues was the expansion of NATO,
supported by the United States, to the Black Sea Region and competition
for the raw material reserves of the Caspian Sea.
Foreign observers debate why the war
broke out when it did? Experts of all camps try to interpret the
dynamic of the events and to develop different explanations of the
conflict. The central question is who has started the war?
Saakashvili denies having ordered the attack on Tskinvali. Russia
claims the opposite. In an interview for CNN, Putin blamed conservative
circles in America for having an interest in provoking the war. Putin
underlined that it was done in order to improve the chances of the
ex-presidential candidate of the Republican Party John McCain, who
refers to Moscow as the new imperialist aggressor. Also the disaster of
the Iraq war needed to be cloaked in a shroud. President Bush, on his
way out of office, desperately needed a success in foreign policy in
order not to be painted by history as a complete loser. His Secretary
of State, Condoleezza Rice, was fighting like a lioness to improve the
diplomatic legacy of the Bush administration.
A legitimate question is whether the
numerous American and Israeli advisors of Saakashvili knew about his
planned attack? According to the newspapers “Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung” and “Moscow Times”, the United States gave Georgia in the
preceding five years 200 million dollars as military aid. Additionally
the Georgian army received 100 Mio U.S. dollars from Turkey; Israel
provided Georgia with a modern air force. With regard to precision
weapons, night vision devices and modern communication equipment, the
Georgian army was better equipped than the Russian before the conflict.
According to one version, American consultants of Saakashvili advised
him against the attack on South Ossetia but failed to persuade their
political pupil.
Supposedly, Russia successfully also
used the aggression of the hot headed Saakashvili to achieve other
strategic objectives in the geopolitically sensitive region. First of
all, it weakened the role of Georgia as an exclusive transit corridor
for oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, by-passing Russia. As long as
Iran is demonised as a rogue state by the United States and remains
isolated, the transport of the energy sources from Central Asia and
Azerbaijan, by-passing Russia, is manageable only via the territory of
Georgia. At the end of the 90s, the former Soviet oil pipeline had been
reactivated from Baku to the Georgian Black Sea coast. In the middle of
this decade, a second pipeline from Baku via Georgia to the Turkish
Mediterranean port of Ceyhan has been laid. Both pipelines brought to
an end the Russian monopoly for oil transport to the West.
Secondly, the war destroyed the chances
of Georgia entering NATO. If it turns out that Saakashvili really
planned the attack on South Ossetia and a quick reunification with the
breakaway republics to increase his membership chances, the doors to
the western military alliance will stay closed for him. As is
well-known, NATO accepts only territorially consolidated states into
its ranks. NATO does not want to interfere into the territorial or
ethnic conflicts in a candidate country, primarily in order to avoid
any possibility of a World War. However, President Bush promised
Saakashvili NATO membership in the nearest future. Did the head of the
Georgian state just want to use this “window of opportunity” in the
last month of the George Bush presidency to utilise the conflict to
slip into NATO via the back door? It is an incredible but coherent
hypothesis.
Thirdly, Russia’s reaction was revenge
for all the humiliations at the hands of the West after the Soviet
Union disintegrated. On this hypothesis, Georgia paid for Kosovo, for
three NATO expansions to the East, for the U.S missile defence system
and for much more. Therefore, according to the Russian point of view,
the unilateral recognition of Abkhazia and South Osssetia is coherent.
After all, it was the West which reconstructed the Balkans according to
its own preference and breached international law into the bargain. At
that time, Russia had no other choice than to watch it happening. But,
Putin and Medvedev turned the tables and played the same card. Now, the
West is watching Moscow arranging the Caucasus according to its own preference, even if it is breaching international law in doing so.
Russia’s changed attitude is of course
problematic. Till now, Moscow insisted that existing international law
should be based on the fundamental principle of the territorial
sovereignty of a state. This argument Moscow deploys in its fight
against Chechen separatists. The preservation of Russia as a state
stands above the question of human rights. The same argument Russia
used in her critique of the recognition of the Serbian province of
Kosovo by the West. The Serbian president, Slobodan Milosevic, had the
right from the Russia’s point of view, to fight with Albanian terrorism
on his own territory. But now, in the case of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, Moscow has quickly adopted the Western argument. Moscow argues
that the protection of human rights in South Ossetia takes priority
over the principle of the state sovereignty of Georgia. But it is not
only Russia which has problems with justification. Suddenly, the West
interpreted the conflict in Georgia against its own principles,
principles which not long before were so vehemently defended in the
case of Kosovo. Everyone bends international law to suit vested
interests.
The new EU and NATO member states are
convinced they are right. They have always warned of a new imperialist
Russia and referred to the reconciliation policy of the “old Europeans”
towards Russia as naïve and strategically wrong. Although this position
was supported by the Bush administration, in Europe, nevertheless, the
collective prevails. How should Russia punished as demanded by Poland
and the Baltic States? Should Western universities kick out all Russian
students as the president of Estonia proposed? Or, as in the case of
Belarus, should the West impose a travel ban on Russian politicians?
Should the EU freeze the bank accounts of the Russian oligarchs, such
as the president of Chelsea football club, Roman Abramovich? In any
case, the “new Europeans” demand that NATO and the EU expand control
instruments against Russia. There is a “Cold War” reappearing on the
direct borders between EU and Russia.
The call for the immediate
inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO is getting louder and
louder. Sometimes it seems that the recent members of the Warsaw Pact
want to prevent the historical reunification of the whole European
continent, including Russia. For the Eastern Europeans, Russia in all
respects will always be the aggressor. The people there are convinced
that, if the West does nothing, Russia could soon invade the Crimea and
the Baltic states. There is no doubt in Warsaw, Tallinn and Riga that
the conflict in Georgia is only the beginning of a Russian offensive
violently to restore its lost empire.
In reality, the West is helpless and
powerless. Firstly, the West is deeply split on the Russian question.
Germany, France and other states cannot unilaterally take the side of
Georgia in order to stay credible in the conflict, especially when
Saakashvili`s responsibility causing the conflict is there for all to
see. Within the EU two extreme positions are colliding with each other.
The Italians, led by Putin’s friend, Silvio Berlusconi, call for
avoiding any condemnation of Russia and simply getting back to everyday
problems. The Poles present the toughest position and bring in their
old agenda of energy and NATO back into the discussion. Suddenly,
everybody is talking about a new “Berlin Wall” which should be built
around the Caucasus in order to prevent new aggression from Russian
Imperialism.
The German and French call upon all
sides in the Georgian conflict to compromise. The Cold War rhetoric is
obnoxious. At an extraordinary summit on September 1st, 2008
the EU finally decided against sanctions against Russia and gave Moscow
tree months to withdraw the rest of the troops form the Georgian core
land. The West needs Moscow´s cooperation on the Iranian question, in
the Middle East, in climate protection, on the issues of
non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and finally in
space-exploration. For security reasons, the EU has postponed the hasty
inclusion of Georgia and Ukraine into NATO. After Saakshvili provoked
the conflict with Russia, the immediate acceptance of Georgia into NATO
would be a signal for others to start new conflicts with Moscow in
order to follow the Georgian way into NATO. However, the EU has broken
off the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement with Russia for the time
being. Objectively, this fact cannot damage Moscow so much. Russia is
not interested in a relationship with the EU on the basis of those
outdated rules. Russia feels strong again and superior to the
Europeans, at least militarily and partly economically.
The influential industrial lobbies in
the countries of the “old EU”, most notably Germany and Italy, but also
France, Spain, Belgium, Netherlands, Austria advise their governments
not to get into confrontation with Moscow. The economic links with
Russia are so advanced now that, in the case of indiscriminate
sanctions against Moscow, the West will cut off its own nose. One
should just examine the trade volumes of the individual EU countries
with Russia to realize that the big western companies make use of all
segments of the Russian market today. Russia produces very little in
her own country. Starting from machinery, industrial technologies, food
products, luxury goods and, not least, financial credits are all
imported form the West. Thousands of jobs in Germany and other EU
countries are directly dependent on the growing Russian market.
The dialogue channels to Moscow should
not be closed; on the other hand, Russia must be persuaded to leave
Georgian territories. First, the EU tries to be active and to raise
money for the reconstruction of Georgia. What should a concrete plan
for Georgia look like? Neither breakaway province can be forced to join
Georgia again, just as Kosovo Albanians could not be part of Serbia
anymore. But the West should also not accept the Russian annexation,
because it can only awaken the further appetite of Russia, for example,
for the Crimea. Could a confederation be a golden solution for the
Georgian problems? Three states in one, as in the case of Bosnia and
Herzegovina? Had the odd EU enough power in foreign policy to be able
to help stabilize the South Caucasus, such a Stability Pact might have
been developed years ago. The Europeans lack the will to realise this
plan. Recently, the EU, under the leadership of Germany, launched a
Central Asia initiative. Should it be now revisited for the South
Caucasus? On the other hand, the EU would have to divert significant
resources from the Balkans in order to stabilize the Caucasus.
Along with setting up social and
economic infrastructures in Georgia, the EU could make an important
contribution to the strengthening of the democratic and constitutional
institutions in the Caucasian republic. Instead of an accretion to
NATO, the EU should offer Georgia the perspective of EU entry. The
Georgian accession to the EU could be realised only if Turkey also
received membership in the European economics and community values. The
Stability Pact should also take into consideration the other conflict
zones in the region.
The frozen conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh could
develop into the next major conflict in the tinderbox of the Caucasus.
Just as Saakashvili equipped his army in order to fight the breakaway
provinces of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the Azeri leader Ilham Aliev
considers it to be his patriotic duty to drive from this territory away
even by force the Armenians who conquered the Azeri province of
Nagorno-Karabakh 15 years ago. The target policy of the EU towards
South Caucasus should also be to bring out a historic reconciliation
between Turkey and Armenia. The still-closed border between Turkey and
Armenia is an obstacle for the European security and defence policy in
the region, which could be part of Europe one day.
Moscow should have placed the emergency
over the sovereignty of both provinces within the hands of
international law. In order to consider this independence legal, one
should have carried out local referendums, as well as the
internalization of the conflict, by the construction of OSCE and UN
monitoring bodies. The presence of international peacekeeping forces is
also required. There are few appropriate models, but there are the
precedents already applied in the Balkan conflict. The Russian side has
the following explanation: Georgia with the support of the USA plans
new attacks on the breakaway republics. These last two could be
defended only with Russian military support. The Russian peacekeeping
troops are not enough to act as a deterrent. Putin also points to the
presence of American warships cruising along the eastern Black sea
coast.
Perhaps, it would be advisable for the
West to start negotiations with Medvedev and Putin about a new OSCE, as
was done before with the Soviets, and to establish coexistence with
Russia on the continent on the basis of a set of common purposes.
Hence, Medvedev’s proposal to work together with the EU, envisaging a
collective construction of Europe, is quite realistic. Even if the West
fights against giving Russia a voice or a right of veto in the
construction of 21st century Europe, it will take some
years, but, afterwards, the idea of Russian membership of NATO will win
more and more supporters among the Russian and Western politicians.
NATO expansion to the East is the biggest obstacle in the relationship
between Russia and the West. The West is only partly right, when it
proclaims that each country has a right to join any military alliance
and Moscow cannot prevent it.
However, one of the main principles of
the European policy after the Cold war is that the security of one
state cannot be ensured at the expense of the safety of another. NATO
can hardly ignore the fact that Russia feels threatened when there is
Western military infrastructure directly on her borders. The today NATO
can theoretically in the next few years integrate all the former Warsaw
Pact countries as well as new independent states on post-Soviet
territory. NATO partnerships with all these countries have existed for
two decades. But Russia also needs a membership perspective, even if it
will be never realized. The invitation for Russia to join NATO will
help to reduce potential conflicts between her and other potential
candidates. As a start, integration could be stared with cooperation on
missile defence. This defence system should protect not only America
and Poland, but also the West and Russia together.
Russia's Geopolitical Scales in the Caucasus, by Sergey Markedonov
The
latest Caucasian cycle of presidential visits to the South Caucasus
ended 2-3 September. During those days Dmitriy Medvedev visited Baku,
capital of Azerbaijan. And although this visit of his was of
significance in its own right (determining the prospects for
Russian-Azerbaijani bilateral relations), it is expedient to analyze
its results in a comparative context, bearing in mind the results of
the Russian head of state's Yerevan trip (19-20 August this year). It
cannot be said that the Russian president's latest Armenian-Azerbaijani
cycle brought revolutionary changes to the South Caucasus. However,
some bright touches were added to the new geopolitical landscape.
Combining Dmitriy Medvedev's two visits into a single Caucasian cycle
does not seem to us to be a mere journalistic metaphor. There are
several reasons for this. And they are not only and indeed not chiefly
to do with Armenia and Azerbaijan.
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After August 2008 Russia and Georgia
diverged to opposite sides of the barricades. It could of course be
said that in the conditions of the 21st century the total isolation of
two countries from each other is impossible (and more important,
unreal). However, the fact remains that despite the preservation (and
even consolidation) of Russian business positions in Georgia, political
contacts between the two countries amount merely to the Geneva talks
format, enabling each of the two diplomatic communities to monitor the
other side's position from time to time. If, indeed, you do not count
visits by (celebrity) Kseniya Sobchak or Mikhail Gorbachev (accompanied
by other influential retirees) as serious political contacts.
Incidentally, the visits to Moscow by (former Georgian Prime Minister)
Zurab Nogaideli and (former parliament speaker) Nino Burjanadze can
also hardly be perceived as anything other than PR operations. On 26
August 2008, by recognizing Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Moscow made its
choice concerning the prospects for relations with Georgia. However,
there are finer points here. Tbilisi made its choice four years earlier
by beginning to "unfreeze the conflicts."
Be that as it may,
Moscow has no serious levers of influence on Georgia. And none can be
foreseen in the immediate future. In military terms Russia's potential
is many times greater than Georgia's, but it is not Moscow's aim to
annihilate Georgia's "sovereign democracy." And indeed the realization
of this idea would encounter more serious resistance from the key world
players than was the case two years ago. At the same time it is
extremely important for the Russian Federation to preserve its
influence in the South Caucasus, in view of the multifaceted links
between that part of the region and the North Caucasus. Hence the
heightened attention paid to contacts with Yerevan and Baku. The loss
of one of these partners would have serious consequences for Russia,
since in that event two out of the three entities recognized by the
world community would be following an anti-Russian (at the very least,
none too benevolent) course. But the snag is that Russia's two
potential partners in the Caucasus are in a relationship of
confrontation with each other. And although war has not been formally
declared between them, there are no diplomatic relations and the
Karabakh conflict is perceived in both Armenia and Azerbaijan as a
military-political standoff, and moreover one that has key significance
for the two states' political identities. Nagorno-Karabakh, to use
images from the Middle East story, is not the "Territories" or the
"Strip." It is Jerusalem. And the conflicting sides are not only
conducting a regional arms race and information warfare but a fierce
struggle for external support. In this respect Moscow is a very
important resource for both Baku and Yerevan. It is therefore no
accident that in the summer of 2010 both Armenian and Azerbaijani
political experts were in no hurry to comment on the August accords
between Moscow and Yerevan, preferring to wait for September' s signals
from Dmitriy Medvedev in Baku. Thus, Russian diplomacy faces a
difficult task -- not to allow itself to be drawn into this race and
not to turn into a player in this confrontation. We have seen that it
is not uncommon for strong powers to become dogs wagged by the tail --
we have seen it in the case of Russia with Chechnya, Abkhazia, and
South Ossetia, and also in the story of American-Georgian relations and
relations between Washington and Pristina. Medvedev's new Caucasus
cycle has shown that, thus far, Moscow is succeeding in solving this
dialectical puzzle. At the beginning of September 2010 the
Armenian-Azerbaijani geopolitical scales were balanced.
I
immediately foresee objections. Moscow prolonged the presence of its
based on Armenian territory (thereby sending a signal to Baku that a
violent solution is not acceptable to it), while Azerbaijan did not
receive any tangible military-political "carrots." It cannot be 100%
ruled out that something like that will appear, in order to bring the
scales into balance. However, no such thing has emerged from the
results of the Russian leader's visit to Baku. For our part we consider
this line of argument superficial. In September 2010 Azerbaijan gained
something that is no less important than tanks and guns. For the first
time in its post-Soviet history it resolved the problem of delimitation
and demarcation of the border with a neighboring state. This problem
has not yet been resolved with any of the other neighboring countries.
With Armenia, Azerbaijan has not so much a border as a front line. And
even the Nakhichevan sector, which is much quieter than the "line of
contact" in Nagorno-Karabakh, is closed and resembles a bristling
border. In the course of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict Armenian forces,
occupying five districts neighboring on Karabakh entirely and two
partially, took control of the former USSR border with Iran on the
River Araks. And despite the positive trend in relations between Tehran
and Baku the border between these two countries is a serious headache
for Azerbaijani politicians (taking into account the growing ambitions
of the Islamic Republic as a regional superpower).
Relations
between Georgia and Azerbaijan are reminiscent of a "honeymoon," but
the position of ethnic Azerbaijanis in Kvemo Kartli also creates
considerable problems in bilateral relations between Baku and Tbilisi.
As for the sea border that Azerbaijan shares with Turkmenistan in the
Caspian, here too everything is very confused. For years now the two
republics have been arguing about the oil and gas deposits in the
Caspian Sea. In the summer of 2009 official Ashgabat even announced its
intention of appealing to the International Court of Arbitration to
uphold its rights to disputed fields.
The problem of
delimitation and demarcation with Russia was also difficult to resolve.
Talks on defining the 390-km state border had been going on for years,
but in 14 years (beginning in 1996) the question had not found a
positive solution. From time to time the sides clashed over the problem
of dividing the water resources of the River Samur. There was
discussion of the legal status of the border villages of Khrakhob and
Uryanob. In 1954 these two villages in Azerbaijan's Khachmazskiy Rayon
were temporarily transferred to the Dagestani ASSR (Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Republic) as pasture land, and 30 years later the Council of
Ministers of the Azerbaijani SSR (Soviet Socialist Republic) extended
the term of the previous document by a further 20 years (to 2004).
The
breakup of the USSR led to major adjustments to the economic plans of
the "party and government." The situation was made more acute by the
fact that the inhabitants were ethnic Lezgins, who also inhabit
Dagestan. By the beginning of the 2000s many of them had acquired
Russian passports. After August 2008 there was much speculation in the
media on the subject of a repetition of the South Ossetian story in
Azerbaijan. Today all this idle theorizi ng and speculation is left to
the historians. Russia has become the first country after the breakup
of the Soviet Union to sign a treaty with Azerbaijan on borders. The
presence in the Russian delegation of important officials responsible
for administration in the North Caucasus (Aleksandr Khloponin,
Yunus-Bek Yevkurov) indicates that Moscow is also positioning the
agreement with Baku as being advantageous to itself. The Dagestan
sector of the Russian border today requires serious (and more
importantly, effective) cooperation with the southern neighbor.
But what did Moscow demand in exchange?
Not
very much, in fact. It is more a question of rhetoric. The Russian
president, while in Baku, stated that he personally (and Russian
diplomacy in implementation of the state's position) is interested in
the peaceful resolution of the Karabakh conflict. Moscow is prepared to
continue to perform a mediation mission to seek compromise solutions.
The signal has been sent, so to speak. Following on from the Yerevan
protocol, the Kremlin is trying to draw the attention of its
Azerbaijani partners to the fact that the Russian Federation is
interested in any solution to the conflict except a military one. But
is Russia capable of fully controlling its interests? The answer to
that question would most likely be negative.
Undoubtedly some
hot heads (both in Baku and in Yerevan) will be cooled by Moscow's
position. But then other considerations come into force, which even the
staunchest admirers of the Kremlin in Armenia and Azerbaijan cannot
ignore. Any Caucasian leader must resort to "patriotic rhetoric" in
order to maintain his legitimacy. This becomes particularly relevant on
the eve of elections (in Azerbaijan the parliamentary campaign is
already gathering pace).
Therefore a resumption of military
rhetoric cannot be ruled out. And this is not because politicians in
Baku are more bloodthirsty. The loss of Karabakh is a national trauma
that nobody is yet prepared to heal. And mentioning it makes it
possible to maintain one's popularity. Thus, Russia's role in both
Azerbaijan and Armenia should not be overestimated. However, the fact
that Moscow is trying to play on several boards at once and attempting
to pursue a balanced and pragmatic policy must be gratifying.
Particularly in the context of other none too successful initiatives.
It would be good if an awareness of geopolitical diversity as a
necessary component of foreign policy would also penetrate other
segments of Russian diplomacy.
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