From the moment Georgia launched a surprise attack on the tiny breakaway region of South Ossetia, prompting a fierce Russian counterattack, Israel has been trying to distance itself from the conflict. This is understandable: with Georgian forces on the retreat, large numbers of civilians killed and injured, and Russia’s fury unabated, Israel’s deep involvement is severely embarrassing. The collapse of the Georgian offensive represents not only a disaster for that country and its U.S.-backed leaders, but another blow to the myth of Israel’s military prestige and prowess. Worse, Israel fears that Russia could retaliate by stepping up its military assistance to Israel’s adversaries. “Israel is following with great concern the developments in South Ossetia and Abkhazia and hopes the violence will end,” its foreign ministry said, adding with uncharacteristic dovishness, “Israel recognizes the territorial integrity of Georgia and calls for a peaceful solution.” Tbilisi’s top diplomat in Tel Aviv complained about the lackluster Israeli response to his country’s predicament and perhaps overestimating Israeli influence, called for Israeli “diplomatic pressure on Moscow.” Just like Israel, the diplomat said, Georgia is fighting a war on “terrorism.” Israeli officials politely told the Georgians that “the address for that type of pressure was Washington”.
While Israel was keen to downplay its role, Georgia perhaps hoped that flattery might draw Israel further in. Georgian minister Temur Yakobashvili -- whom the Israeli daily Haaretz stressed was xxxish -- told Israeli army radio that “Israel should be proud of its military which trained Georgian soldiers.” Yakobashvili claimed rather implausibly, according to Haaretz, that “a small group of Georgian soldiers were able to wipe out an entire Russian military division, thanks to the Israeli training” Since 2000, Israel has sold hundreds of millions of dollars in arms and combat training to Georgia. Weapons included guns, ammunition, shells, tactical missile systems, antiaircraft systems, automatic turrets for armored vehicles, electronic equipment and remotely piloted aircraft. These sales were authorized by the Israeli defense ministry. The Israeli connection,” Ynet, 10 August 2008). Training also involved officers from Israel’s Shin Bet secret service -- which has for decades carried out extrajudicial executions and torture of Palestinians in the occupied territories -- the Israeli police, and the country’s major arms companies Elbit and Rafael.
The Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis appears to have been cemented at the highest levels, and according to YNet, “The fact that Georgia’s defense minister, Davit Kezerashvili, is a former Israeli who is fluent in Hebrew contributed to this cooperation.” Others involved in the brisk arms trade included former Israeli minister and Tel Aviv mayor Roni Milo as well as several senior Israeli military officers. The key liaison was Reserve Brigadier General Gal Hirsch who commanded Israeli forces on the border with Lebanon during the July 2006 Second Lebanon War. (Yossi Melman, “Georgia Violence -- A frozen alliance,” Haaretz, 10 August 2008). He resigned from the army after the Winograd commission severely criticized Israel’s conduct of its war against Lebanon and an internal Israeli army investigation blamed Hirsch for the seizure of two soldiers by Hezbollah. According to one of the Israeli combat trainers, an officer in an “elite” Israel army unit, Hirsch and colleagues would sometimes personally supervise the training of Georgian forces which included “house-to-house fighting.” The training was carried out through several “private” companies with close links to the Israeli military.
As the violence raged in Georgia, the trainer was desperately trying to contact his former Georgian students on the battlefront via mobile phone: the Israelis wanted to know whether the Georgians had “internalized Israeli military technique and if the special reconnaissance forces have chalked up any successes” (Jonathan Lis and Moti Katz, “IDF vets who trained Georgia troops say war with Russia is no surprise,” Haaretz, 11 August 2008). Yet on the ground, the Israeli-trained Georgian forces, perhaps unsurprisingly overwhelmed by the Russians, have done little to redeem the image of Israel’s military following its defeat by Hezbollah in July-August 2006. The question remains as to why Israel was involved in the first place. There are several reasons. The first is simply economic opportunism: for years, especially since the 11 September 2001 attacks, arms exports and “security expertise” have been one of Israel’s growth industries. But the close Israeli involvement in a region Russia considers to be of vital interest suggests that Israel might have been acting as part of the broader U.S. scheme to encircle Russia and contain its reemerging power.
Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has been steadily encroaching on Russia’s borders and expanding NATO in a manner the Kremlin considers highly provocative. Shortly after coming into office, the Bush Administration tore up the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty and, like the Clinton administration, adopted former Soviet satellite states as its own, using them to base an anti-missile system Russia views as a threat. In addition to their “global war on terror,” hawks in Washington have recently been talking up a new Cold War with Russia. Georgia was an eager volunteer in this effort and has learned quickly the correct rhetoric: one Georgian minister claimed that “every bomb that falls on our heads is an attack on democracy, on the European Union and on America.” Georgia has been trying to join NATO, and sent 2,000 soldiers to help the U.S. occupy Iraq. It may have hoped that once war started this loyalty would be rewarded with the kind of round-the-clock airlift of weapons that Israel receives from the U.S. during its wars. Instead so far the U.S. only helped airlift the Georgian troops from Iraq back to the beleaguered home front.
By helping Georgia, Israel may have been doing its part to duplicate its own experience in assisting the eastward expansion of the “Euro-Atlantic” empire. While supporting Georgia was certainly risky for Israel, given the possible Russian reaction, it has a compelling reason to intervene in a region that is heavily contested by global powers. Israel must constantly reinvent itself as an “asset” to American power if it is to maintain the U.S. support that ensures its survival as a settler-colonial enclave in the Middle East. It is a familiar role; in the 1970s and 1980s, at the behest of Washington, Israel helped South Africa’s apartheid regime fight Soviet-supported insurgencies in South African-occupied Namibia and Angola, and it trained right-wing U.S.-allied death squads fighting left-wing governments and movements in Central America. After 2001, Israel marketed itself as an expert on combating so-called ”Islamic terrorism”.
Georgia’s government, to the detriment of its people, may have tried to play the role of a loyal servant of U.S. ambitions in that region -- and lost the gamble. Playing with empires is dangerous for a small country. As for Israel itself, with the Bush Doctrine having failed to give birth to the “new Middle East” that the U.S. needs to maintain its power in the region against growing resistance, an ever more desperate and rogue Israel must look for opportunities to prove its worth elsewhere. That is a dangerous and scary thing.
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad said on Wednesday he would use this week's visit to Russia to expand military ties with Moscow whose arms sales to the Middle Eastern state have angered the West. Israel and the United States have long urged Russia not to sell weapons to Syria -- a key Moscow ally during the Cold War now at the centre of Kremlin ambitions of reviving Russia's Soviet-era role in the Middle East. Assad told Kommersant newspaper that Russia's conflict with Georgia, in which Moscow says Georgia used Israeli-supplied equipment, underlined the need for Russia and Syria to tighten their defence cooperation. "Of course military and technical cooperation is the main issue. Weapons purchases are very important," he said. "I think we should speed it up. Moreover, the West and Israel continue to put pressure on Russia." Assad is expected to met Russian President Dmitry Medvedev on Thursday.
A diplomatic source in Moscow told Interfax news agency that Russia and Syria were preparing a number of deals involving anti-aircraft and anti-tank missile systems. "Damascus is Moscow's long-standing partner in military cooperation and we are expecting to reach an agreement in principle on new weapons deals," said the source. Syria is also interested in Russia's Pantsyr-S1 Air Defence Missile systems, BUK-M1 surface-to-air medium-range missile system, military aircraft and other hardware, the source said. Russia's military said this week Israel supplied military vehicles and explosives to Georgia and helped train its army. Israel says it does not supply arms to other countries as a government but private firms conduct equipment sales and training with the defence ministry's approval. Assad, whose army is largely equipped with Russian-designed military hardware, said Israel's role would only encourage countries like Syria -- a U.S. foe and ally of Iran -- to step up cooperation with Russia. "I think that in Russia and in the world everyone is now aware of Israel's role and its military consultants in the Georgian crisis," Assad told Kommersant. "And if before in Russia there were people who thought these forces can be friendly then now I think no one thinks that way." The West and NATO have sharply criticised Russia over its military action in Georgia this month.
U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said Russia was turning into an outlaw in the conflict and accused Moscow of targeting civilians in Georgia. The conflict between Georgia and Russia erupted when Georgia tried to reimpose control over the breakaway, pro-Russian South Ossetia region earlier this month. Russia responded with a counter-attack that overwhelmed Georgian forces. Russia then moved troops beyond South Ossetia and a second separatist region, Abkhazia, and deep into Georgian territory.
The Russian aircraft carrier “Admiral Kuznetsov” is ready to head from Murmansk towards the Mediterranean and the Syrian port of Tartus. The mission comes after Syrian President Bashar Assad opens up for a Russian base in the area. The “Admiral Kuznetsov”, part of the Northern Fleet and Russia’s only aircraft carrier, will head a Navy mission to the area. The mission will also include the missile cruiser “Moskva” and several submarines, Newsru.com reports. President Assad in meetings in Moscow this week expressed support to Russia’s intervention in South Ossetia and Georgia. He also expressed interest in the establishment of Russian missile air defence facilities on his land. The “Admiral Kuznetsov” also last year headed a navy mission to the Mediterranean. Then, on the way from the Kola Peninsula and south, it stopped in the North Sea where it conducted a navy training exercise in the immediate vicinity of Norwegian offshore installations.
General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, deputy chief of staff of the Russian Military revealed Tuesday the extent of the military assistance Moscow claimed Jerusalem had given Georgia. "Israel armed the Georgian army," he told reported at a press conference held in the Russian capital. According to Nogovitsyn, Israel provided Georgia with "eight types of military vehicles, explosives, landmines and special explosives for the clearing minefields." Since 2007, he continued, Israeli experts have been training Georgian commando troops; and Israel had planned to supply Georgia with heavy firearms, electronic weapons and tanks, but that plan was eventually scrapped. Nogovitsyn stressed that despite reports to the contrary, Russia began pulling its troops form Georgia on Monday, claiming further that the withdrawal will be accelerated on Wednesday. Georgia, he added, was in breach of the ceasefire agreement, since is had not pulled its troops to the positions they held prior to the conflict.
Russia Shows its Canines
The
Russians did not only fight in Georgia but they drew a sharp red line
for their national security. Simply they said that violation of the
vital space of Russia means war. The United States understood the
massage from the moment Russia started its military operations there and
the Pentagon spokesperson declared that the American military personnel
in Georgia have nothing to do with this war. However, this was not the
only message Russia has sent. The more important message was that the
presence of American military personnel in a country does not mean that
this country would be immune if threatened Russian interests. At first,
Bush asked the Russians to pull their troops while the Georgian army was
advancing in South Ossetia. Then he called for a ceasefire after the
Russian army engaged in a battle that its results could be predicted.
The Russians gave him a deaf ear and they entered Tskhinvali by force
and air-raided a military base near Tibilisi. At last, the Americans
said that Georgia was partly responsible about the crisis.
The
pro-Western Georgian government and President Mikheil Saakashvili took
the uncalculated decision to attack the pro-Russia South Ossetia and the
Russian peacekeeping force there. The Russians proclaimed that
Washington instigated him to do. Then they accused Ukraine of doing
that. If it was, Washington then the Americans sacrificed Georgia to
test the Russian seriousness about defending its interests before
deploying the anti-missile missiles in Czech and Poland and before
giving the green line for Ukraine and Georgia to apply for NATO
membership. If it was Ukraine then it wanted to revenge for its
disturbed relationship with Russia about gas supply, application to
NATO, navy bases on the Black Sea and the Russian support for the big
opposition that lost the last election with slight marginal results.
Anyhow, it seems that uncalculated decisions are not exclusive to the
Middle East.
Now
the Americans and the Ukrainians know. The consequences were clear.
Poland asked the European Council to hold an emergency meeting. In other
words, Poland asks its partner a serious question, what if Russia
decided to return to East Europe. Putin announced that it would be
difficult for Georgia to keep sovereignty over South Ossetia. Bush
called for the integrity of Georgia. The Naval siege of Georgian coast
means a lot. If Russia will stay in Abkhazia or if it will occupy the
Georgian coast, it will not need the Ukrainian ports anymore. The
pro-Russia Abkhazia started military operations against Georgia. It was
clear that Russia well armed the two enclaves, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. When Georgia accused Russia of using the air force against its
bases, the Abkhazian separatists declared that their planes did that. To
my knowledge, this is the first time a separatist group could have an
air force.
Azerbaijan
announced that it would stop its oil export through the Georgian port.
Then the central Asian oil will be threatened if not controlled by
Russians. Referring to the Iranian continuous threats that it would
close the Gulf, and then the energy supply to Europe will be threatened.
This means that the American fought seven years for nothing. From here a
third world war would start if the US and Russia did not agree about
the rules of the new game in central Asia quickly. When Kosovo declared
independence, Russia threatened the West that it would announce Abkhazia
and South Ossetia two independent states. President Saakashvili should
not have given the Russian this opportunity. The rule is that small
countries should not threat the interests of superpowers. If he tried to
find common interests with Russia and postponed NATO application until
the US and Russia strike their global deal which is a must
geopolitically if they were to confront China, he would have saved his
country much trouble and even he might have find ways to negotiate with
separatists. He made himself a card in the American hands before the
deal and Russia responded by making his country a card in its hands.
The
American wanted also to test president Medevedv. It is clear that his
policy is much the same like his Godfather Putin. Some observers say
that Putin is still the de facto leader of the country. This means that
the Americans have to live with Putin´s policy for a long time to come.
After the eight years of Medevedv´s presidency, he and his Godfather may
simply exchange posts again. The Russians learnt much from their lesson
in Afghanistan and most probably, they will not repeat the mistake and
go into a long war. They will arm the separatists and the Georgian peace
would be a history if Tibilisi insisted on fighting. Another thing
Putin declared that most of the two thousands citizens that were killed
were Russians. He said frankly that this cleansing crime would not go
without punishment. He simply says to the West as you tried our Serbian
allies I will do the same to your Georgian allies. The Georgians accuse
Russians of doing that and they said that the victims were Georgians. Of
course, the American could not comment about cleansing war in Georgia.
They cannot ask the international criminal court to do anything because
Putin and Medevedv are not Bashir if they chose to believe the Georgian.
However if they stroke a deal with Russia, they will give their back to
the Georgian president and he would become a war criminal.
The
Russian-Georgian war may be the most serious war in the Pax-Americana
future. It may mark the return of Russia as a global force. It will draw
another red line for the US. Now the world has two powers if not three
with China who could start a war without previous coordination with
regional or international powers. This reduces the American influence in
some regions. The West depends upon Afghan´s neighboring countries,
Russia one of them, in the logistics in its war there. Most of these
countries are in the Russian vital space. Most probably, the West will
give Georgia the lip service and leaves it for Russia to decide its
future to ensure the safety of its operations.
One
last thing a Russian top official said that Israelis trained the
Georgian army. The Israeli Foreign Ministry asked the Military
Institutions to stop arms sales to Georgia after few hours. Previously
Israel did not care about any country but the US. Does Tzipi Levini feel
the change? Both US and Russia have changed during Bush and Putin era.
What is happening in Georgia is a hot chapter of their dialogue about
their future alliance. The exchange of words between the American and
Russian presidents did not reflect their real position on the ground.
President Bush said that he stood for Georgia´s integrity, but his
Foreign Secretary Rice met with Georgian President Saakashvili to force
him to sign a ceasefire that its fifth article stated the independence
and sovereignty but not integrity of his country. The Washington Post
said frankly that Russia is more important for the US than Georgia is.
To assess gains and losses of the different parts of the crisis, one
should not compare Russia to Georgia. Comparing Georgia to South Ossetia
and Abkhazia regionally and comparing Russia to the US globally gives a
better in depth analysis.
On
the regional level, Georgia was the first loser. It started a war to
control its breakaway South Ossetia that ended with risking losing both
South Ossetia and Abkhazia and parts of its territories became under
Russian occupation. Some Georgian cities have been destroyed. It is
difficult for investors to risk putting their money in Georgian projects
again. The Georgian army was easily defeated and the road to Tibilisi
was open for the Russian army. It became very doubtful that Georgia
membership in NATO or EU might be achieved any time soon or even after
many years. Most probably, the temporary ceasefire accord will be
replaced by a second one after long negotiations that will put Georgia
in the Russian influence sphere and will restrict armament of the
Georgian army. Whether a temporary second cold war became the world
order or US-EU-Russia partnership could be reached, Georgia will not
have any role except for its port Porti on the Black Sea that might by
used by the alliances. Saakashvili is the biggest loser and his
political future is in its last days or months. If he is lucky, he will
escape serving long terms in Russian prisons. The US did not give its
ally except one million dollars worth of humanitarian aid beside words
of support.
On
the global level, Russia achieved some of its targets. It put an end for
the American humiliation that has been continuous since 1989. It proved
itself as a guarantor of the Caucasus as Medevedv said. It showed the
American its military might and the will to use this might in a limited
low cost military operation. It put a red line for NATO not to further
approach Russia. If Abkhazia got its independence or became a Russian
Republic then Russia will secure its navy accessibility to the Black Sea
and the Mediterranean. The ex-Soviet Union Asian independent states
will think twice before signing any military or security accord with the
US and the West and most probably, Russia will be the third party in
these partnerships. Russia became the controller of European energy
supply after it achieved control or threat of oil and gas pipelines from
Central Asia ensuring a rift between the US and Europe in their Russian
policies. It told the world, that it did not fear another Cold War. Its
Foreign Minister said bluntly to the Americans that the US has to
choose between partnership with Russia or its support for Georgia.
Shortly after Rice and Saakashvili press conference, the BBC asked an
American political science professor to comment. He said that the US
needs Russia more than Russia needs the US. The American Defence
Minister Gates attacked Russia verbally but when he was asked about
trust between Bush and Putin, he said that national security is built on
risks and interests not on trust. Bush visited the CIA headquarters to
brief him about the situation and he was told that the American policy
about Russia is being revised.
Why
does the US revise its Russian policy? Regardless of the US-Poland
preliminary accord of the antimissile shield that provoked the Russian
Deputy of Chief to announce that Poland will be a target for Russian
missiles, the Americans discovered that their policy of humiliating
Russia went so far that they have lost a dear. Medevedv said more
bluntly that Georgia or any state harms Russians the military operations
will be repeated. The crisis exposed the Western alliance that there
are rifts in the national security views. While Bush was talking about
isolating Russia, the German Defence Minister stressed on having open
channels with Russia. Few days ago, Sarkozy admitted that Russia has the
right to protect Russian speaking communities while he was in Moscow.
The German Chancellor Merkel said that Russia slightly overreacted in
the press conference while she was in Moscow. It is noticeable that if
one has not heard the event he would have find that some Western Media
just omit few adjectives and adverbs that mean a lot. The Western Media
omitted the word slightly when it commented about Merkel´s statement.
When Bush warned Russia that now is not 1968 when the ex-Soviet Union
conquered Czechoslovakia, he had to remember that now is not 1945, when
Europe needed Marshal project. It is not only the energy that may
dictate European independent policies about Russia but also security.
The KJB servicemen are now serving in the Russian intelligence. They
have contacts with communist terrorist groups as Badermienhoff in
Germany, Bask Revolutionists in Spain, the Red Brigades in Italy, the
Republican Army in Ireland, the Communists in Greece, the Kurds in
Turkey, the Red Army in Japan and many others. With the Euro equals one
and half dollar Europe does not want to risk its energy supply, economy,
and its security.
Will
be there another Cold War? Geopolitically, the American strategists
will discover that they need Russia and the American media analysis told
that. If there will be another Cold War it will be temporary and most
probably the next American Administration will have another pack of
policies. The US cannot risk Russia siding with China. This scenario
means the end of Pax-Americana for good. The Neo-Cons´ militarization of
foreign policy proved to be harmful. If the US and Russia did not agree
soon, there might be a high level of violence in Iraq and Afghanistan.
During the crisis, the US called for China to cooperate in Darfur. This
means that the idea of giving a space for other superpowers is present
in the strategic thinking in Washington. As both Russia and Georgia
accuse each other of ethnic cleansing but the US chose to believe
Georgia, the international court prosecutor Okambo, cannot issue an
arrest warranty against Medevedv and Putin. He declared a very strange
statement that he accused Bashir as a person not as a president. If
Okambo was serious, then Bashir took his decisions about Darfur in the
scope of being a president. Anyhow double standard policies was one of
the causes that made Russia act as tit for tat, Kosovo for Abkhazia and
South Ossetia and Saakashvili for its Serbian war criminals. Regardless
of who committed crimes, the Russians tell the Americans that you
established a rule stating that victorious dictates laws and now the
Russian Bear is the victorious over an army that its weapons are
American and its officers are trained by American and Israeli trainers.
Will
the Caucasus war have reflections and implications on the Middle East?
Iran may have a larger space for its nuclear file and Syria may show
some strength in its negotiations with Israel. Yet, one should know that
both the US and Russia will look after their interests. They both have
the ability and the will to use force but not against each other.
Interests dictate national security policies and dictate alliances with
superpowers. As Europe guards its steps between the US and Russia, the
Arabs should do the same. The US may accelerate the Israeli-Palestinian
negotiations and may change its policies about Iran to destroy its
nuclear facilities to deprive Russia from having an ally who is already
hostile to the West and the US in particular. One last word until Russia
responds to the US in Latin America and in the Middle East there is no
Cold War. The most important is the fact that making a country a card
encourages others to play games for their interests. This is the story
of the man who put his hand in the Bear´s mouth to satisfy others who
used him as a Guinea Pig in the political laboratory.
Source:
http://www.americanchronicle.com/articles
The Russo-Georgian War and the Balance of Power
The
Russian invasion of Georgia has not changed the balance of power in
Eurasia. It simply announced that the balance of power had already
shifted. The United States has been absorbed in its wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, as well as potential conflict with Iran and a destabilizing
situation in Pakistan. It has no strategic ground forces in reserve and
is in no position to intervene on the Russian periphery. This, as we
have argued, has opened a window of opportunity for the Russians to
reassert their influence in the former Soviet sphere. Moscow did not
have to concern itself with the potential response of the United States
or Europe; hence, the invasion did not shift the balance of power. The
balance of power had already shifted, and it was up to the Russians when
to make this public. They did that Aug. 8.
Let’s
begin simply by reviewing the last few days. On the night of Thursday,
Aug. 7, forces of the Republic of Georgia drove across the border of
South Ossetia, a secessionist region of Georgia that has functioned as
an independent entity since the fall of the Soviet Union. The forces
drove on to the capital, Tskhinvali, which is close to the border.
Georgian forces got bogged down while trying to take the city. In spite
of heavy fighting, they never fully secured the city, nor the rest of
South Ossetia. On the morning of Aug. 8, Russian forces entered South
Ossetia, using armored and motorized infantry forces along with air
power. South Ossetia was informally aligned with Russia, and Russia
acted to prevent the region’s absorption by Georgia. Given the speed
with which the Russians responded — within hours of the Georgian attack —
the Russians were expecting the Georgian attack and were themselves at
their jumping-off points. The counterattack was carefully planned and
competently executed, and over the next 48 hours, the Russians succeeded
in defeating the main Georgian force and forcing a retreat. By Sunday,
Aug. 10, the Russians had consolidated their position in South Ossetia.
On
Monday, the Russians extended their offensive into Georgia proper,
attacking on two axes. One was south from South Ossetia to the Georgian
city of Gori. The other drive was from Abkhazia, another secessionist
region of Georgia aligned with the Russians. This drive was designed to
cut the road between the Georgian capital of Tbilisi and its ports. By
this point, the Russians had bombed the military airfields at Marneuli
and Vaziani and appeared to have disabled radars at the international
airport in Tbilisi. These moves brought Russian forces to within 40
miles of the Georgian capital, while making outside reinforcement and
resupply of Georgian forces extremely difficult should anyone wish to
undertake it.
The Mystery Behind the Georgian Invasion
In
this simple chronicle, there is something quite mysterious: Why did the
Georgians choose to invade South Ossetia on Thursday night? There had
been a great deal of shelling by the South Ossetians of Georgian
villages for the previous three nights, but while possibly more intense
than usual, artillery exchanges were routine. The Georgians might not
have fought well, but they committed fairly substantial forces that must
have taken at the very least several days to deploy and supply.
Georgia’s move was deliberate. The United States is Georgia’s closest
ally. It maintained about 130 military advisers in Georgia, along with
civilian advisers, contractors involved in all aspects of the Georgian
government and people doing business in Georgia. It is inconceivable
that the Americans were unaware of Georgia’s mobilization and
intentions. It is also inconceivable that the Americans were unaware
that the Russians had deployed substantial forces on the South Ossetian
frontier. U.S. technical intelligence, from satellite imagery and
signals intelligence to unmanned aerial vehicles, could not miss the
fact that thousands of Russian troops were moving to forward positions.
The Russians clearly knew the Georgians were ready to move. How could
the United States not be aware of the Russians? Indeed, given the
posture of Russian troops, how could intelligence analysts have missed
the possibility that the Russians had laid a trap, hoping for a Georgian
invasion to justify its own counterattack?
It
is very difficult to imagine that the Georgians launched their attack
against U.S. wishes. The Georgians rely on the United States, and they
were in no position to defy it. This leaves two possibilities. The first
is a massive breakdown in intelligence, in which the United States
either was unaware of the existence of Russian forces, or knew of the
Russian forces but — along with the Georgians — miscalculated Russia’s
intentions. The second is that the United States, along with other
countries, has viewed Russia through the prism of the 1990s, when the
Russian military was in shambles and the Russian government was
paralyzed. The United States has not seen Russia make a decisive
military move beyond its borders since the Afghan war of the
1970s-1980s. The Russians had systematically avoided such moves for
years. The United States had assumed that the Russians would not risk
the consequences of an invasion.
If
this was the case, then it points to the central reality of this
situation: The Russians had changed dramatically, along with the balance
of power in the region. They welcomed the opportunity to drive home the
new reality, which was that they could invade Georgia and the United
States and Europe could not respond. As for risk, they did not view the
invasion as risky. Militarily, there was no counter. Economically,
Russia is an energy exporter doing quite well — indeed, the Europeans
need Russian energy even more than the Russians need to sell it to them.
Politically, as we shall see, the Americans needed the Russians more
than the Russians needed the Americans. Moscow’s calculus was that this
was the moment to strike. The Russians had been building up to it for
months, as we have discussed, and they struck.
The Western Encirclement of Russia
To
understand Russian thinking, we need to look at two events. The first
is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. From the U.S. and European point of
view, the Orange Revolution represented a triumph of democracy and
Western influence. From the Russian point of view, as Moscow made clear,
the Orange Revolution was a CIA-funded intrusion into the internal
affairs of Ukraine, designed to draw Ukraine into NATO and add to the
encirclement of Russia. U.S. Presidents George H.W. Bush and Bill
Clinton had promised the Russians that NATO would not expand into the
former Soviet Union empire. That promise had already been broken in 1998
by NATO’s expansion to Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic — and
again in the 2004 expansion, which absorbed not only the rest of the
former Soviet satellites in what is now Central Europe, but also the
three Baltic states, which had been components of the Soviet Union.
The
Russians had tolerated all that, but the discussion of including
Ukraine in NATO represented a fundamental threat to Russia’s national
security. It would have rendered Russia indefensible and threatened to
destabilize the Russian Federation itself. When the United States went
so far as to suggest that Georgia be included as well, bringing NATO
deeper into the Caucasus, the Russian conclusion — publicly stated — was
that the United States in particular intended to encircle and break
Russia. The second and lesser event was the decision by Europe and the
United States to back Kosovo’s separation from Serbia. The Russians were
friendly with Serbia, but the deeper issue for Russia was this: The
principle of Europe since World War II was that, to prevent conflict,
national borders would not be changed. If that principle were violated
in Kosovo, other border shifts — including demands by various regions
for independence from Russia — might follow. The Russians publicly and
privately asked that Kosovo not be given formal independence, but
instead continue its informal autonomy, which was the same thing in
practical terms. Russia’s requests were ignored.
From
the Ukrainian experience, the Russians became convinced that the United
States was engaged in a plan of strategic encirclement and
strangulation of Russia. From the Kosovo experience, they concluded that
the United States and Europe were not prepared to consider Russian
wishes even in fairly minor affairs. That was the breaking point. If
Russian desires could not be accommodated even in a minor matter like
this, then clearly Russia and the West were in conflict. For the
Russians, as we said, the question was how to respond. Having declined
to respond in Kosovo, the Russians decided to respond where they had all
the cards: in South Ossetia. Moscow had two motives, the lesser of
which was as a tit-for-tat over Kosovo. If Kosovo could be declared
independent under Western sponsorship, then South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
the two breakaway regions of Georgia, could be declared independent
under Russian sponsorship. Any objections from the United States and
Europe would simply confirm their hypocrisy. This was important for
internal Russian political reasons, but the second motive was far more
important.
Russian
Prime Minister Vladimir Putin once said that the fall of the Soviet
Union was a geopolitical disaster. This didn’t mean that he wanted to
retain the Soviet state; rather, it meant that the disintegration of the
Soviet Union had created a situation in which Russian national security
was threatened by Western interests. As an example, consider that
during the Cold War, St. Petersburg was about 1,200 miles away from a
NATO country. Today it is about 60 miles away from Estonia, a NATO
member. The disintegration of the Soviet Union had left Russia
surrounded by a group of countries hostile to Russian interests in
various degrees and heavily influenced by the United States, Europe and,
in some cases, China.
Resurrecting the Russian Sphere
Putin
did not want to re-establish the Soviet Union, but he did want to
re-establish the Russian sphere of influence in the former Soviet Union
region. To accomplish that, he had to do two things. First, he had to
re-establish the credibility of the Russian army as a fighting force, at
least in the context of its region. Second, he had to establish that
Western guarantees, including NATO membership, meant nothing in the face
of Russian power. He did not want to confront NATO directly, but he did
want to confront and defeat a power that was closely aligned with the
United States, had U.S. support, aid and advisers and was widely seen as
being under American protection. Georgia was the perfect choice. By
invading Georgia as Russia did, Putin re-established the credibility of
the Russian army. But far more importantly, by doing this Putin revealed
an open secret: While the United States is tied down in the Middle
East, American guarantees have no value. This lesson is not for American
consumption. It is something that, from the Russian point of view, the
Ukrainians, the Balts and the Central Asians need to digest. Indeed, it
is a lesson Putin wants to transmit to Poland and the Czech Republic as
well. The United States wants to place ballistic missile defense
installations in those countries, and the Russians want them to
understand that allowing this to happen increases their risk, not their
security.
The
Russians knew the United States would denounce their attack. This
actually plays into Russian hands. The more vocal senior leaders are,
the greater the contrast with their inaction, and the Russians wanted to
drive home the idea that American guarantees are empty talk. The
Russians also know something else that is of vital importance: For the
United States, the Middle East is far more important than the Caucasus,
and Iran is particularly important. The United States wants the Russians
to participate in sanctions against Iran. Even more importantly, they
do not want the Russians to sell weapons to Iran, particularly the
highly effective S-300 air defense system. Georgia is a marginal issue
to the United States; Iran is a central issue. The Russians are in a
position to pose serious problems for the United States not only in
Iran, but also with weapons sales to other countries, like Syria.
Therefore, the United States has a problem — it either must reorient its
strategy away from the Middle East and toward the Caucasus, or it has
to seriously limit its response to Georgia to avoid a Russian counter in
Iran. Even if the United States had an appetite for another war in
Georgia at this time, it would have to calculate the Russian response in
Iran — and possibly in Afghanistan.
In
other words, the Russians have backed the Americans into a corner. The
Europeans, who for the most part lack expeditionary militaries and are
dependent upon Russian energy exports, have even fewer options. If
nothing else happens, the Russians will have demonstrated that they have
resumed their role as a regional power. Russia is not a global power by
any means, but a significant regional power with lots of nuclear
weapons and an economy that isn’t all too shabby at the moment. It has
also compelled every state on the Russian periphery to re-evaluate its
position relative to Moscow. As for Georgia, the Russians appear ready
to demand the resignation of President Mikhail Saakashvili. Militarily,
that is their option. That is all they wanted to demonstrate, and they
have demonstrated it. The war in Georgia, therefore, is Russia’s public
return to great power status. This is not something that just happened —
it has been unfolding ever since Putin took power, and with growing
intensity in the past five years. Part of it has to do with the increase
of Russian power, but a great deal of it has to do with the fact that
the Middle Eastern wars have left the United States off-balance and
short on resources. The Russian goal is to use that window to assert a
new reality throughout the region while the Americans are tied down
elsewhere and dependent on the Russians. The war was far from a
surprise; it has been building for months. But the geopolitical
foundations of the war have been building since 1992. Russia has been an
empire for centuries. The last 15 years or so were not the new reality,
but simply an aberration that would be rectified. And now it is being
rectified.
Source:
http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/russo..._balance_power
Tbilisi Admits Misjudging Russia
Georgia
did not believe Russia would respond to its offensive in South Ossetia
and was completely unprepared for the counter-attack, the deputy defence
minister has admitted. Batu Kutelia told the Financial Times that
Georgia had made the decision to seize the South Ossetian capital of
Tskhinvali despite the fact that its forces did not have enough
anti-tank and air defences to protect themselves against the possibility
of serious resistance. “Unfortunately, we attached a low priority to
this,” he said, sitting at a desk with the flags of Georgia and Nato (to
which Georgia does not belong) crossed behind him. “We did not prepare
for this kind of eventuality.” The Georgian military felt there was only
a low probability of a massive Russian counter-attack, despite the
bloody way in which Russia destroyed Chechnya, on the other side of the
Caucasus mountains, in two wars during the 1990s and the fact that
separatists in South Ossetia and Abkhazia had Russian backing. Georgian
forces were unprepared when the Russian counter-strike came, Mr Kutelia
said. “I didn’t think it likely that a member of the UN Security Council
and the OSCE would react like this,” Mr Kutelia said. His amazement
that Russia would use force against a smaller neighbour was echoed by
David Darchiashvili, head of the parliamentary European integration
committee. “No one expected Russia would mobilise and invade,” he said.
Georgia’s 20,000-man army, built up at a cost of $2bn with the help of
US trainers and cast-off Warsaw Pact equipment, was organised to deal
with “brushfire” wars with separatist enclaves on its borders and to
contribute to missions such as Iraq as a way of shoring up Georgia’s
ties with the west, not to do battle with Russia. Mr Kutelia still puts
blame for the war squarely on the Russians and their South Ossetian
allies, saying that in early August Ossetian fighters began to shell
Georgian positions and villages.
He
said Russia had begun to move heavy armour through the Roki tunnel from
North Ossetia before President Mikheil Saakashvili unleashed his
military against the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali on August 7,
but offered no evidence to back this up. Mr Kutelia said that the
Georgians moved despite not having enough anti-tank and air defences,
not expecting the Russians to react with overwhelming force.“At some
point there was no choice,” he said. Mr Kutelia said damage to Georgia’s
military infrastructure was “significant”, and it would take an
enormous amount of foreign help to rebuild Georgia’s defensive
capabilities, something the Russians have promised to flatten again if
they feel it poses a threat. Russian troops have entered many of
Georgia’s military bases, often under the eyes of a cowed Georgian army.
They have confiscated US Humvee vehicles, blown up coastguard vessels
and ransacked some of Georgia’s most modern military bases, destroying
radar and other air defences, as well as reportedly capturing Georgian
tanks, small arms and ammunition. So far Russia has made no move to
return its booty. The cost of Georgia’s lack of preparation could be
seen earlier this week, when seven soldiers killed in earlier fighting
were buried in a cemetery on a dusty hillside outside the capital. About
20 troops in fatigues, and one in black track pants, watched from the
shade of a pine tree as a bulldozer pushed sandy soil into the long
trench holding the bodies.
Source:
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/0d8beefe-6...0779fd18c.html
Georgia Facing Reality of Defeat
When
Russian troops eventually pull out of Georgian towns such as Gori and
Zugdidi, ordinary Georgians will heave a sigh of relief. But that will
also be the moment that they take on board the fact that the two
territories at the heart of the conflict with Moscow, South Ossetia and
Abkhazia, although formally still regarded internationally as Georgian
territory, are now essentially lost to them. The people who will suffer
most in the long term from this conflict are more than 20,000 ethnic
Georgians from a mosaic of villages in South Ossetia who have now mostly
fled. Relatively few Georgians left during or after the small-scale
1990-92 conflict over South Ossetia and despite intermittent skirmishes
and incidents, neighbourly contacts continued. Reporters who have passed
through many of the villages in the last few days say they are now in
ruins. The Russian authorities and their South Ossetian allies are now
saying that they will not allow the Georgians back any time soon. A
Russian foreign ministry statement on August 18 said, "It is clear that
some time – and not a short period of time – must pass in order to heal
the wounds and to restore confidence. Only after this, the conditions
will be created for discussing practical aspects related to the problems
of refugees." Hundreds of South Ossetians also lost their homes in the
Georgian military assault of 7-8 August and, it appears, in the ensuing
Russian counter-attack - but they have the small consolation of knowing
they can start rebuilding them.
Russian leverage
The
prospect is also now much bleaker for the 240,000 or so ethnic
Georgians who were registered as displaced from the 1992-3 conflict in
Abkhazia. Their hopes of return were predicated on a successful peace
agreement which now looks more elusive than ever. Around 50,000
Georgians live in Abkhazia's southernmost Gali district under an Abkhaz
administration. So far they have managed to stay in their homes, but
their future is also more precarious. It is not just a matter of
Georgian control. It will also be harder now to maintain an
international presence in the two disputed regions. The final point in
the six-point ceasefire plan reads: "Pending an international mechanism
[in South Ossetia], Russian peacekeeping forces will implement
additional security measures." That effectively puts an end to the
former Joint Peacekeeping Forces, which had a Georgian contingent. It
also gives Moscow even more leverage than before over the shape of any
security arrangements for the region. Moscow is already insisting it can
have the only real security presence there. "We are of course not
against international peacekeepers... but the problem is that the Abkhaz
and the Ossetians do not trust anyone except Russian peacekeepers,"
Russian president Dmitry Medvedev told German chancellor Angela Merkel.
Unattainable dream
The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only
international organization with a mandate in South Ossetia, wants to
dispatch an additional 100 monitors to South Ossetia. But Russia has
dragged its feet, saying it wanted to agree the terms of their
deployment in more detail and the OSCE has so far agreed to send just 20
more monitors. The OSCE had just nine military monitors on the ground
in South Ossetia when fighting started there on 7-8 August. The European
Union, with French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner taking the lead,
also says it want to provide peacekeepers, but Mr Kouchner's Swedish
counterpart, Carl Bildt, admitted this might not work. "There are no
signs of the Russians letting in anyone else," he said. In Abkhazia, the
United Nations has a small contingent of around 130 unarmed monitors,
who were bystanders in the recent crisis. When the Abkhaz, with Russian
support, wanted to capture the mountainous Upper Kodori Gorge district
from the Georgians, they merely gave the UN monitors there a 24-hour
warning to leave. The EU has approved small aid programmes for both
Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the last few years, but they have looked
relatively modest when compared to the vast amount of Russian money
coming into both regions. Abkhazia is bigger and more diverse than South
Ossetia with a lively media and many non-governmental organizations.
Many Abkhaz intellectuals dreamed of having some kind of independence
free of both Georgia and Russia and with links across the Black Sea to
the EU but that now looks unattainable.
'Double standards'
Internationally
mediated peace talks over both disputes had stalled and there is little
chance of them resuming properly any time soon. Faced with a tightening
Russian grip, Western leaders can only fall back on expressing support
for Georgia's right to these territories. US President George W Bush
made this commitment on 16 August, saying: "Georgia's borders should
command the same respect as every other nation's. There's no room for
debate on this matter." This becomes a moral argument, with the Russians
answering that after supporting Kosovo's unilateral secession from
Serbia, the West is guilty of "double standards" in the Caucasus. Caught
in the middle of these international wrangles are the current and
former populations of both Abkhazia and South Ossetia – Abkhaz,
Ossetians and other nationalities such as Armenians on the one hand, and
the displaced Georgians on the other. They often get along fine when
they have a chance to engage in low-level meetings arranged by foreign
organisations or across market stalls. Now, unfortunately, they are
being wrenched apart further than ever by conflict.
Source:
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7571002.stm
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