Russia keeps watchful eye on Crimea
Ahead of key elections in Ukraine Al Jazeera reports from the region of Crimea, scene of what some say was the world's first "modern" conflict, and now an election battleground as politicians argue over Ukraine's relationship with Russia. If it was in a different place on the map, Sevastopol might be known more widely as a tourist attraction. If it was on a different place on the map, you might not see quite so many memorials to the war dead here, they are everywhere. Imperial Russia fought the British and French to a standstill on these shores in the Crimean war. A century later, Sevastopol became known for its proud resistance to the Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of thousands have died around here in the last two centuries and everyone, it seems, wants to own Sevastopol.
Harbouring ambitions
You can see the reason for the current tension as you pass through the harbour. Until ten years ago, the ships in its port were all part of the same Soviet fleet. Now they are divided under Ukrainian and Russian flags, and their respective commanders must be wondering for how much longer they are likely to remain friends. If you accept that the current political crisis in Ukraine is an ideological one, either to maintain historical ties with Russia, or to form new ones with the West, then here is where you can see it being played out most dramatically. It is one thing for Ukrainian and Russian ships to coexist peacefully enough for the moment. It is quite another, surely, for a future Nato fleet to sit in the same harbour as a Russian one. Particularly given the current view of Nato in Moscow.
Vocal support
There is lots about Crimea that is Russian through and through. The language for one thing, the ways in which people look and behave. No surprise then that the Party of Regions, which carries half of the vote here, wants a referendum on keeping Russian as an official language, and keeping Ukraine out of Nato. Vadim Kolesnichenko, from the party's Sevastopol branch, said: "It's not the matter of language, it's a matter of human rights. Everyone has a right to speak their own language and has a right to defend his culture and communicate with his friends and relatives using their native language." If that sounds diplomatic, the blunter version is espoused by the communists, still worth tens of thousands of votes, who accuse Nato of causing disaster wherever it goes, and fear catastrophe if it got its claws into Crimea. "Are you ready to die for Nato?" reads one poster, "Not here". "We don't want the Yugoslavian scenario to repeat here or [like in] Afghanistan or the Caucasus," Vasily Parkhomenko, of the Ukrainian Communist party, says. "So we consider the presence of the Russian fleet a guarantor of peace here in the south of Ukraine. "We know where Nato appears, the blood and suffering appear as well."
Better bet
Even if one day the Russian fleet was forced out by the pro-European, pro-Nato supporters of the Orange revolution in 2004 there is much else that would be far harder to shift, a Russian installation cut under a mountain, for one thing. No-one here has any idea what it is for, and staying around it is not a very good idea. Still, some are prepared to suggest Nato might be a better option for Crimea, as well as Ukraine in general. "When Ukraine is in Nato relations with Russia will become more straightforward than they are now," Sergei Kluik, a military analyst, says. "There wont be as many arguments with decision making."
Bloody battle
This time every year they hold a commemoration for the many thousands of Russians who died in one particularly bloody battle of the Crimean war. It was particularly special this year, as they found the remains of fourteen Russian soldiers and gave them the full send off. This weekend the voters of Crimea will join the rest of the country at the polls, and a decisive vote one way or the other could lay the ground for strategic alliances which could have consequences far beyond the horizon. It is a point worth bearing in mind, since it is young men that tend to pay the price when the great powers use foreign pieces of land for their great games.
Source: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exer...B5351CFA0A.htm
In other news:
Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with British backing probable) is now preparing to recognize Kosovo's independence unilaterally _ irrespective of the consequences for Europe and the world. Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of Serbia. But, with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority demanding its own state, and with Russia refusing to recognize U.N. mediator Martti Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence, the U.S. is preparing to go it alone. Instead of thinking what Ahtisaari deemed unthinkable, a partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north going to Serbia and the rest linked to the Kosovars ethnic brethren in Albania or a separate state, the U.S. plans to act without the U.N.'s blessing, arguing that only an independent Kosovo will bring stability to the Western Balkans. That argument is debatable _ and the record of the Kosovar government suggests that it is wrong. But the U.S. position is unambiguously misguided in not foreseeing that the ``Kosovo precedent" will incite instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.
Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes have gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered since 1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974, and Israel's occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential flashpoints. Nevertheless, the U.S. _ and most European Union members _ argue that Kosovo's situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding international precedent. But Russia sees things very differently. Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to re-establish its authority over the nations and territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. Spain and Cyprus with their worries over secessionist-minded regions, are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the fallout from Kosovo's unilaterally gaining independence on neighboring Moldova. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognize the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian troops and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years. Ukraine _ the great prize in Russia's bid to recapture its former sphere of influence _ is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954).
Russia may decide to abuse the Kosovo precedent further to divide Ukraine's population between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers. But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that Russia may recognize breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, _ and back them more strongly than it does now. Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, the Kremlin was making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into its economy.
Russia's supposed ``peacekeeping troops" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia's other secession-minded region, have in fact protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing a complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the resolve of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili. Should Russia recognize Abkhazia's independence, Saakashvili might be tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from unraveling. Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk of open warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as there are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the breakaway government.
Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian support) will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed independence from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian, endured a bloody secessionist war between1988 and 1994, with 30,000 killed and 14 percent of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Russian-backed Armenian forces. Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare than it was in the 1990's. Moreover, it has neighboring Turkey on its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on Armenia, including closure of its border.
Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug in and have received a significant boost from Russia's diversion of heavy weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military bases. Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border in Armenia, partly as a security measure in case of a U.S. attack and partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains eager to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri minority in northern Iran.
The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually called "frozen conflicts," because not much has happened since they began in the early 1990's. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its independence is likely to unfreeze them _ fast and bloodily. And such potential bloodshed on Russia's border may give Vladimir Putin the pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally mandated end next March.
Source: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news...137_11176.html
Harbouring ambitions
You can see the reason for the current tension as you pass through the harbour. Until ten years ago, the ships in its port were all part of the same Soviet fleet. Now they are divided under Ukrainian and Russian flags, and their respective commanders must be wondering for how much longer they are likely to remain friends. If you accept that the current political crisis in Ukraine is an ideological one, either to maintain historical ties with Russia, or to form new ones with the West, then here is where you can see it being played out most dramatically. It is one thing for Ukrainian and Russian ships to coexist peacefully enough for the moment. It is quite another, surely, for a future Nato fleet to sit in the same harbour as a Russian one. Particularly given the current view of Nato in Moscow.
Vocal support
There is lots about Crimea that is Russian through and through. The language for one thing, the ways in which people look and behave. No surprise then that the Party of Regions, which carries half of the vote here, wants a referendum on keeping Russian as an official language, and keeping Ukraine out of Nato. Vadim Kolesnichenko, from the party's Sevastopol branch, said: "It's not the matter of language, it's a matter of human rights. Everyone has a right to speak their own language and has a right to defend his culture and communicate with his friends and relatives using their native language." If that sounds diplomatic, the blunter version is espoused by the communists, still worth tens of thousands of votes, who accuse Nato of causing disaster wherever it goes, and fear catastrophe if it got its claws into Crimea. "Are you ready to die for Nato?" reads one poster, "Not here". "We don't want the Yugoslavian scenario to repeat here or [like in] Afghanistan or the Caucasus," Vasily Parkhomenko, of the Ukrainian Communist party, says. "So we consider the presence of the Russian fleet a guarantor of peace here in the south of Ukraine. "We know where Nato appears, the blood and suffering appear as well."
Better bet
Even if one day the Russian fleet was forced out by the pro-European, pro-Nato supporters of the Orange revolution in 2004 there is much else that would be far harder to shift, a Russian installation cut under a mountain, for one thing. No-one here has any idea what it is for, and staying around it is not a very good idea. Still, some are prepared to suggest Nato might be a better option for Crimea, as well as Ukraine in general. "When Ukraine is in Nato relations with Russia will become more straightforward than they are now," Sergei Kluik, a military analyst, says. "There wont be as many arguments with decision making."
Bloody battle
This time every year they hold a commemoration for the many thousands of Russians who died in one particularly bloody battle of the Crimean war. It was particularly special this year, as they found the remains of fourteen Russian soldiers and gave them the full send off. This weekend the voters of Crimea will join the rest of the country at the polls, and a decisive vote one way or the other could lay the ground for strategic alliances which could have consequences far beyond the horizon. It is a point worth bearing in mind, since it is young men that tend to pay the price when the great powers use foreign pieces of land for their great games.
Source: http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exer...B5351CFA0A.htm
In other news:
Russia and the Kosovo Card
Look before you leap is as sound a principle in foreign policy as it is in life. Yet, once again, the Bush administration is preparing to leap into the unknown. Even though lack of foresight is universally viewed as a leading cause of its Iraq debacle, the United States (with British backing probable) is now preparing to recognize Kosovo's independence unilaterally _ irrespective of the consequences for Europe and the world. Kosovo has been administered since 1999 by a United Nations mission guarded by NATO troops, although it remains formally a part of Serbia. But, with Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority demanding its own state, and with Russia refusing to recognize U.N. mediator Martti Ahtisaari's plan for conditional independence, the U.S. is preparing to go it alone. Instead of thinking what Ahtisaari deemed unthinkable, a partition of Kosovo with a small part of the north going to Serbia and the rest linked to the Kosovars ethnic brethren in Albania or a separate state, the U.S. plans to act without the U.N.'s blessing, arguing that only an independent Kosovo will bring stability to the Western Balkans. That argument is debatable _ and the record of the Kosovar government suggests that it is wrong. But the U.S. position is unambiguously misguided in not foreseeing that the ``Kosovo precedent" will incite instability and potentially even violence elsewhere.
Why the rush to give Kosovo independence? Many serious disputes have gone unresolved for decades. The Kashmir question has lingered since 1947, the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus since 1974, and Israel's occupation of the West Bank from 1967. Yet no one is suggesting that unilateral solutions be imposed in these potential flashpoints. Nevertheless, the U.S. _ and most European Union members _ argue that Kosovo's situation is sui generis and will set no legally binding international precedent. But Russia sees things very differently. Indeed, it may seek to use this precedent to re-establish its authority over the nations and territories that were once part of the Soviet Union. Spain and Cyprus with their worries over secessionist-minded regions, are worried by any possible precedent. Romania fears the fallout from Kosovo's unilaterally gaining independence on neighboring Moldova. The worry is that Russia will unilaterally recognize the breakaway Moldovan territory of Transdnistria, which Russian troops and criminal gangs have been propping up for 16 years. Ukraine _ the great prize in Russia's bid to recapture its former sphere of influence _ is also deeply anxious. It fears that Russia will encourage separatist tendencies in Crimea, where the ethnic Russian population forms a majority. (Crimea was ceded to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev only in 1954).
Russia may decide to abuse the Kosovo precedent further to divide Ukraine's population between Russian speakers and Ukrainian speakers. But the biggest risks posed by unilateral recognition of Kosovo's independence are in the South Caucasus, a region that abuts the tinderbox of today's Middle East. Here, there is a real danger that Russia may recognize breakaway regions in the South Caucasus, _ and back them more strongly than it does now. Even before Vladimir Putin became Russia's president, the Kremlin was making mischief in Georgia, issuing Russian passports to citizens of Abkhazia (the largest breakaway region) and pouring money into its economy.
Russia's supposed ``peacekeeping troops" in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia's other secession-minded region, have in fact protected their rebel governments. Russia has also been enforcing a complete trade embargo on Georgia in the hope of weakening the resolve of its pro-Western president, Mikhail Saakashvili. Should Russia recognize Abkhazia's independence, Saakashvili might be tempted to respond militarily to prevent his country from unraveling. Renewed conflict in Abkhazia would not only bring the risk of open warfare with Russia, but strain relations with Armenia, as there are near to 50,000 Armenians in Abkhazia who support the breakaway government.
Another risk in the South Caucasus is that Russia (with Armenian support) will recognize Nagorno-Karabakh's self-proclaimed independence from Azerbaijan. Nagorno-Karabakh, historically Armenian, endured a bloody secessionist war between1988 and 1994, with 30,000 killed and 14 percent of Azerbaijan's territory occupied by Russian-backed Armenian forces. Since then, oil has fuelled an Azeri military buildup. So the government in Baku is far more prepared to respond to renewed warfare than it was in the 1990's. Moreover, it has neighboring Turkey on its side. Turkey is already enforcing a punitive economic embargo on Armenia, including closure of its border.
Military projections by the US have repeatedly suggested that Azerbaijan would lose such a battle, even with newly purchased equipment and Turkish military support. Armenian forces are well dug in and have received a significant boost from Russia's diversion of heavy weaponry to Armenia from some recently closed Georgian military bases. Iran also must be factored into this equation, as it is becoming a strategic investor by building an oil refinery just across its border in Armenia, partly as a security measure in case of a U.S. attack and partly to relieve its petrol shortages. Moreover, Iran remains eager to contain Azerbaijani revanchist claims over the large Azeri minority in northern Iran.
The conflicts in Transdnistria and the South Caucasus are usually called "frozen conflicts," because not much has happened since they began in the early 1990's. Any unilateral move to give Kosovo its independence is likely to unfreeze them _ fast and bloodily. And such potential bloodshed on Russia's border may give Vladimir Putin the pretext he may desire to extend his rule beyond its constitutionally mandated end next March.
Source: http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news...137_11176.html
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I have come to see the Russian nation as the last front on earth against the scourges of Westernization, Americanization, Globalism, Zionism, Islamic extremism and pan-Turkism. I have also come to see Russia as the last hope humanity has for the preservation of classical western/European civilization, ethnic cultures, Apostolic Christianity and the concept of traditional nation-state. Needless to say, an alliance with Russia is Armenia's only hope for survival in a dangerous place like the south Caucasus. These sobering realizations compelled me to create this blog in 2010. This blog quickly became one of the very few voices in the vastness of Cyberia that dared to preach about the dangers of Globalism and the Anglo-American-Jewish alliance, and the only voice emphasizing the crucial importance of Armenia's close ties to the Russian nation. Today, no man and no political party is capable of driving a wedge between Armenia and Russia. Anglo-American-Jewish and Turkish agenda in Armenia will not succeed. I feel satisfied knowing that at least on a subatomic level I have had a hand in this outcome.
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